

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7

O.C.E. 343
14,311

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7

C.C.F. 343
14,311

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
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C.F.S. 143
14,321

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C.F.S. 545
14,331

TOP SECRET

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TOP SECRET

TO : Colonel Buxton

DATE: 30 May 1944

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: P.W. Plan - ETO, 1944

When you have had a chance to see the ^{five} ~~four~~ papers transmitted with Colonel Gridley's letter of 22 May 1944, we believe you may wish to refer them to the Planning Group.

The Secretariat is notifying Colonel Mann that these documents have been received.

D. C. Lee
D. C. Lee

Referred to Planning Group.

H. Buxton

TOP SECRET

OS Form No. 4034

TOP SECRET

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| Addressed to: [illegible] | Accession No: [illegible] |
| Document date: May 23 | Accession date: 24 June |
| Document No: CCS-545/copy No: | Office or Branch: [illegible] |
| No. of pages: 99-Attachments: | Logged by: [illegible] |

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| 5. | | [illegible] | | | [illegible] | | |
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| CLASSIFIED BY: <i>Detach OLS</i> | ACCESSION DATE: <i>24 Jan</i> | | |
| CLASSIFIED BY: <i>SCS IN</i> TOP NO: <i>1005</i> | OFFICE OR BRANCH: <i>Operations Staff</i> | | |
| NO. OF PAGES: <i>99</i> | LOGGED BY: <i>W. J. P.</i> | | |

ATTENTION:

545/1, 545/2, 545/3, 545/4, 545/5

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| 1 | <i>Planning Staff</i> | <i>A.H. Onthank</i> | <i>5/15</i> | | <i>AHO</i> | <i>7/1</i> | <i>135</i> |
| 2 | <i>OSS Secretariat</i> | <i>Duncan R. Lee</i> | <i>5/15</i> | <i>1120</i> | <i>DL</i> | <i>7/1</i> | <i>1120</i> |
| 3 | <i>LS Williams</i> | <i>KRM</i> | <i>29 May</i> | <i>1620</i> | <i>KRM</i> | <i>29 May</i> | <i>1620</i> |
| 4 | <i>SSD</i> | <i>W. J. P.</i> | <i>29 May</i> | <i>1715</i> | <i>WJP</i> | <i>29 May</i> | <i>1715</i> |
| 5 | <i>Sec</i> | <i>Duncan R. Lee</i> | <i>29 May</i> | <i>1800</i> | | | |
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Duncan R. Lee
(ORIGINATING TSCO)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

23 May 1944


MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Subject: Outline Plan for Political Warfare -
"OVERLORD"

Reference: JCS memorandum to OSS, dtd 23 May 44,
subject as above

Enclosure: CCS 545/5, 22 May 44, subject as above,
copy #65

Supplementing above reference, the enclosure is
furnished herewith for your information and files.


CECIL J. GRIDLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Secretary



TOP SECRET

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C.C.S. 545/5

22 May 1944

COPY NO. 65

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE - "OVERLORD"

Note by the Secretaries

1. By informal action, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation contained in C.C.S. 545/4. The proposed message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, was dispatched as FACS 28.

2. The proposal by General Eisenhower in SCAP 27 is identical in wording with that suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 545/3.

H. REDMAN,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Combined Secretariat.

TOP SECRET

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

22 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL SERVICES

**Subject: Outline Plan for Political Warfare -
"OVERLOOK"**

**Reference: JCS memorandum to OCS, 22 May 44,
subject as above**

**Enclosure: OCS 542/3, 22 May 44, subject as above,
copy JCS**

**Supplementing above reference, the enclosure is
furnished herewith for your information and files.**

**CHARL J. BRIDLEY
Colonel, U.S.C.
Assistant Secretary**



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TOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 May 1944


MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Subject: Outline Plan for Political Warfare - "OVERLORD"

Reference: JCS memorandum to OSS, dtd 13 April 44,
subject as above.

Enclosures: CCS 545/1, 30 Apr 44, subject as above, copy 471
CCS 545/2, 11 May 44, subject as above, copy 470
CCS 545/3, 11 May 44, subject as above, copy 445
CCS 545/4, 20 May 44, subject as above, copy 487

Supplementing above reference, the enclosures are
furnished herewith for your information and files..


CECIL J. GRIDLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Secretary



TOP SECRET

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C.O.S. 545/3

20 May 1944

COPY NO. 1

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFOUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE - "OVERLORD"
Reference: C.O.S. 545/3Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with the views of the British Chiefs of Staff as expressed in C.O.S. 545/3, concerning a section on Austria for the Outline Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD (C.O.S. 545), and recommend that if the British Chiefs of Staff concur the attached message be dispatched to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

CCS 545/3

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT OF PROPOSED MESSAGE

From: The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

To: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Changes suggested in SCAF 27 with respect to a section on Austria are acceptable as part of the Outline Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD.

TOP SECRET

C.C.S. 545/3

11 May 1944

COPY NO. 48
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)1220
GCS 545 Series
JCS 036COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFOUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE - "OVERLORD"Memorandum by the Representatives
of the British Chiefs of Staff

1. With regard to the United States Chiefs of Staff proposal that a section on Austria should be added, the British Chiefs of Staff have proposed that the following footnote, which has been drawn up in consultation with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, should be added at the end of page 2 in Annex 1 of the Political Warfare Executive - Office of War Information "Outline Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD" (C.C.S. 545):

BEGINS

Austria.

In propaganda to Austrians, our objectives are not essentially different from those given above. The main differences of emphasis are:-

Under objective (c), it is part of our objective to exploit the Moscow Declaration, thereby showing Austrians that the consequences of Germany's unconditional surrender include the liberation of Austria and are far preferable to the Austrians than the continuance of Hitler's war, particularly if the Austrians contribute to their own liberation.

Under objective (e), it is part of our objective to exploit the difference in tradition and interest between Austria and Nazi Germany, in order to increase to a maximum Austrian dissatisfaction with Hitler's leadership which has brought them nothing but sacrifices. ENDS

2. The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on this proposal are requested.

TOP SECRET

C.C.S. 545/2

11 May 1944

COPY NO. 70

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE - "OVERLORD"

Note by the Secretaries

The message contained in the enclosure to C.C.S. 545/1 was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by informal action, and dispatched to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (FACS 24), in the form shown in the enclosure to this paper. Reference to C.C.S. 545 was deleted from the message, as the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has not been furnished a copy of that paper. The new page references refer to the original document forwarded to the Combined Secretariat by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

A. J. McFARLAND,
R. D. COLERIDGE,
Combined Secretariat.

TOP SECRETENCLOSURE

11 May 1944

FAOS 24

Priority

From: The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

To: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have considered the Outline Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD and in general agree with the provisions of the plan.

However, certain changes which can readily be incorporated in the plan are desirable. Specifically, these are:

a. The reference on page 7 to recognition of the French National Committee of Liberation should be eliminated. On the same and following page references to the Mediterranean Commission should be changed to Advisory Council for Italy.

b. As regards the references to Germany, we believe that with respect to the propaganda objectives set forth in Annex 1, it would be wise to eliminate paragraphs C8 and C9 (page 8).

c. It is noted that the document makes no mention of Austria. In view of the Moscow Declaration, a section on Austria should be added.

d. That section of the document on page 19 which suggests the encouragement of people in the occupied countries to collect evidence for and against local officials is questionable. There will probably be all too much of this sort of thing without our encouragement. Since civil administration is to be a function of the national governments concerned, who doubtless have their own means of knowing what local personages have been working with the enemy, we believe this problem should be left to them.

TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 11C.C.S. 545/1(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)30 April 1944COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFOUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE - "OVERLORD"Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

We are of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept the Outline Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD (C.C.S. 545), with certain minor changes which are set forth in the attached draft of a proposed message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

It will be noted that the principal amendment suggested is the addition of a section on Austria. Although this is not an essential feature, it should be helpful in view of the Moscow Declaration on Austria.

If the British Chiefs of Staff approve, it is recommended that the enclosed message be dispatched to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~ENCLOSURE~~DRAFT OF PROPOSED MESSAGE

From: The Combined Chiefs of Staff.
 To: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have considered the Outline Plan for Political Warfare - OVERLORD (C.C.S. 545) and in general agree with the provisions of the plan.

However, certain changes which can readily be incorporated in the plan are desirable. Specifically, these are:

a. The reference on page 10 to recognition of the French National Committee of Liberation should be eliminated. On the same and following page references to the Mediterranean Commission should be changed to Advisory Council for Italy.

b. As regards the references to Germany, we believe that with respect to the propaganda objectives set forth in Annex 1, it would be wise to eliminate paragraphs C8 and C9 (page 11).

c. It is noted that the document makes no mention of Austria. In view of the Moscow Declaration, a section on Austria should be added.

d. That section of the document on page 29 which suggests the encouragement of people in the occupied countries to collect evidence for and against local officials is questionable. There will probably be all too much of this sort of thing without our encouragement. Since civil administration is to be a function of the national governments concerned, who doubtless have their own means of knowing what local personages have been working with the enemy, we believe this problem should be left to them.

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

20 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Outline Plan for Political Warfare - "OVERLAP"

**Reference: JCS memorandum to CIG, dated 18 April 44,
subject as above.**


**Enclosures: COS 545/1, 20 Apr 44, subject as above, copy 500
COS 545/2, 11 May 44, subject as above, copy 500
COS 545/3, 11 May 44, subject as above, copy 500
COS 545/4, 20 May 44, subject as above, copy 500**

**Supplementing above references, the enclosures are
furnished herewith for your information and files.**

**OSCAR J. GRIMLEY
Colonel, U.S.A.
Assistant Secretary**



TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

19 April 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Outline Plan for Political Warfare - "Overlord"
(CSG 545).

1. The Office of Strategic Services acknowledged the receipt on 17 April 1944 through the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Copy No. 47 of CSG 545, 13 April 1944, Outline Plan for Political Warfare - "Overlord". At the same time, a copy of this document, which is awaiting approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was transmitted to the Strategic Services Planning Group with an oral request for comments. The Strategic Services Planning Group transmits its comments in a separate memorandum, which is transmitted herewith.

2. The comments of the Strategic Services Planning Group reflect the views of this Agency. In addition, however, it is desired to make this further statement. There seems to be no provision for the participation of the Office of Strategic Services or any of its branches in strategic plans or strategic activities. This Outline Plan for Political Warfare appears to provide that such plans and activities shall be put into effect by PWG and OGI. To our best understanding of the present situation this limited arrangement does not reflect the facts. The Morale Operations and Research and Analysis Branches of OSS, though not referred to in the plan, nonetheless have important relationships and responsibilities in connection with political warfare.

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-2-

Through its participation in FWD, OSS is now actively engaged in such activities in close support of contemplated military operations. I believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will agree that OSS in its various branches and in particular in MO (Morale Operations), also has facilities available for use in strategic political warfare plans and activities. We assume that the Theater Commander, who is also familiar with these facilities, will not wish to be barred from availing himself of these by reason of the wording of such an overall plan.

G. Edward Bryant
Acting Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

15 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

From: Office of Strategic Services,
Planning Group

Subject: Outline Plan for Political Warfare -
"Overlord"

1. The Planning Group acknowledges the receipt yesterday, through the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of CCS 548, 13 April 1944, Outline Plan for Political Warfare - "Overlord", copy #57.

2. It is noted that the plan has the approval of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and that the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is now requested. It has been suggested orally that comments from the Planning Group are desired.

3. The plan as drawn seems to us to reflect the situation as it existed in the summer and autumn of 1943, not the situation as it now exists. The draft of the covering or overall section and the drafts of the three Annexes were dated 5 October 1943. The Regional Summaries were dated 26 November 1943, but their implementation was stated to be dependent upon acceptance by the Conseil de la Resistance in the case of France, and upon certain specific support by Governments in Exile in the cases of Belgium, Holland and Norway. What response if any has been obtained from the Conseil and these Governments does not appear.

4. Since the plan was drawn there have been important changes in the European Theater of Operations. The Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force has taken the place of COSSAG, which last fall was only in a preliminary state of organization. We understand that the psychological warfare activities contemplated in the Plan have now been made wholly or principally functions of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division and/or Political (or Psychological) Warfare Branch SHAEF, which will be manned largely from the (British) Political Warfare Executive, from OWI, and from OSS.

- 3 -

5. The details of organization of FMS in HFO we understand still to be incomplete. Not enough has been reported to show that the MO (Morale Operations) and RMA (Research and Analysis) Branches of OAS will have important functions along with FMI and OWI in its administration and operations. The duties of the SO (Special Operations) Branch of OAS in cooperation with SOG we understand to be substantially the same as are set forth in the plan, though now in a more mature stage than is there indicated.

6. The Planning Group considers that if the plan were to be revised now, giving effect to changes in organization, noted above, believed to be nearing completion, particularly those involving combat propaganda, it would furnish an effective program for operations.

7. Subject to the foregoing reservations, the Planning Group favors the plan.

Shepard Morgan
Acting Chairman

cc: Mr. Morgan
Gen. Smith
Secretariat
Col. Sigelow
Mo Branch


TOP SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PLANNING GROUP****INTEROFFICE MEMO**

TO: Acting Director, Strategic Services **DATE 19 April 1944**
 FROM: Acting Chairman, SS Planning Group
 SUBJECT: Outline Plan for Political Warfare - "Overlord".

Attached hereto is a proposed reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the Plan which was submitted directly to the Planning Group yesterday, with a request for comments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Planning Group has agreed on this reply.

In its deliberations, the Planning Group had the advantage of discussion with Lt. Col. Biegler and Lt. (j.g.) McFadden who have agreed with the attached reply.

Since this subject is to be discussed by the Joint Staff Planners this afternoon, 19 April 1944, the comments of the Planning Group should be delivered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before 1200 today.



Shepard Morgan
 Acting Chairman

attachment

TO: SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PLANNING GROUP

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Acting Director, Strategic Services **DATE: 19 April 1944**
FROM: Acting Chairman, SS Planning Group
SUBJECT: Outline Plan for Political Warfare - "Overlord".

Attached hereto is a proposed reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the Plan which was submitted directly to the Planning Group yesterday, with a request for comments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Planning Group has agreed on this reply.

In its deliberations, the Planning Group had the advantage of discussion with Lt. Col. Bieglow and Lt. (j.g.) McFadden who have agreed with the attached reply.

Since this subject is to be discussed by the Joint Staff Planners this afternoon, 19 April 1944, the comments of the Planning Group should be delivered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before 1200 today.

Shepard Morgan

Shepard Morgan
 Acting Chairman

attachment

TOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

13 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Subject: Outline Plan for Political Warfare -
"OVERLORD"

Enclosure: CCS 545, 13 April 1944, Outline Plan
for Political Warfare - "OVERLORD",
copy #47.

The enclosure is furnished herewith for your
information and files.

Cecil J. Gridley
CECIL J. GRIDLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Secretary



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH SERVICE

Subject: Outline Plan for Political Warfare -
"OVERLAP"

Enclosure: OUS 548, 18 April 1944, Outline Plan
for Political Warfare - "OVERLAP",
copy 407.

The enclosure is furnished herewith for your
information and files.

GEORGE J. GIBLIN
Colonel, U.S.A.
Assistant Secretary



TOP SECRETC.C.S. 54513 April 1944

COPY NO. 47

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFOUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE - "OVERLORD"Note by the Secretaries

1. In the enclosure to this paper will be found the outline plan for political warfare (equals U.S. psychological warfare) for Operation OVERLORD. It has been submitted by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, where it was prepared by the representatives of the Offices of War Information and the Political Warfare Executive. The plan has the approval of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. Approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is now requested.

2. The French section of the plan may require amendment in the light of the final decision yet to be taken regarding the degree of recognition to be accorded to the French Committee of National Liberation.

H. REDMAN,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Combined Secretariat.

TOP SECRETI N D E XOUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE--"OVERLORD"

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TOP SECRETPOLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVEReference P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for
Political Warfare (- U.S. Psychological Warfare)

The above Plan has now been approved by "COSSAC" and is being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to the following additions and amendments:-

1. On page 2*, sentence has been added to the last sub-paragraph to III, 1, as follows:-

"Careful political advice must be secured on this matter and reflected in the weekly and special directives which implement the Plan".

2. Page 4** has been redrafted; a copy of the redraft is attached.

/s/ R. D. BROOKS.
(Major-General)

Deputy Director-General
P.W.E.

8.12.43.

*Page 4 of this paper.

**Beginning with note 2 at bottom of page 6 and ending at bottom of page 7, this paper contains redraft of 5 October 1943.

TOP SECRETOVERLORDP.W.E. /O.W.I. OUTLINE PLAN
FOR POLITICAL WARFARE (= U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE)I. TERMS OF REFERENCE

In accordance with the instructions received from COMSAC, P.W.E. and O.W.I., in appropriate consultation with S.O.E. and O.S.S., submit the following OUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARFARE (= U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE) to prepare the way for OVERLORD and RANKIN and to assist whichever operation eventuates. For Political Warfare purposes the preparatory phase is common to OVERLORD and RANKIN, the only difference being timing.

II. APPRECIATION

1. Morale in Germany will be a "tougher nut to crack" than was the case in Italy where conditions were advantageous for Political Warfare operations. Nevertheless, morale in Germany has attained a brittle state which presents promising opportunities for Political Warfare. (e.g. The existence of six million foreign workers who have been pressed into forced labour in Germany and who form an indispensable but explosive part of the German war machine.)

2. While the Balkan Satellites lie outside the direct scope of the proposed operations, events in the Balkans can materially assist OVERLORD. There is an opportunity for Political Warfare to exploit several factors which might combine to bring about conditions in the Balkans which would seriously affect German morale as well as military dispositions. These factors include: the course of military events especially on the Russian front; the growing activities of patriot forces in Yugoslavia and Greece; and the fact that the Satellites are now within range of Allied air power. These could be used to precipitate a crisis in the already vacillating Satellites.

TOP SECRET

3. The Occupied Peoples have been prepared and ripe for Allied military intervention for some time. Their expectations have been greatly heightened by recent events. This gives Political Warfare a three-fold responsibility in each Occupied Country: first that of furthering the still incomplete organization and coordination of the Resistance Movements; second that of checking premature outbursts; and third that of precipitating a crisis when desired, and if necessary on a European scale.

4. In all calculations, Political Warfare must take into consideration the extent to which conditions created by the fifth winter of the war favour morale operations in Germany and the Satellites, or militate against them in the Occupied Territories.

III. OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS

1. The impact of Fascism and four years of German domination have created a powerful ferment of political forces throughout Europe. These do not necessarily follow the pre-war political pattern, but the common trend is against the political and economic conditions which led to the progressive destruction of the rights of the individual.

Whereas the State uses Diplomacy directly to influence Governments, political personalities and dominant groups, it uses Political Warfare to exert direct and indirect influence upon the mass of the people; Political Warfare must therefore utilise the popular trends and emergent forces in Europe.

To render the maximum assistance to OVERLORD and RANKIN, Political Warfare must, at the proper time, exploit and canalise these political ferments existing behind the enemy lines. The timing of uprisings must be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. Whether he will be able to rely upon and direct the forces generated by these ferments depends upon the degree to which the Political Warfare agencies are able effectively to stimulate, organize and guide them.

TOP SECRET

Political Warfare agencies can only stimulate such forces effectively if the highest authorities give political support to these movements and sanction such stimulation. * See page 1.

2. The effectiveness of Political Warfare in connection with OVERLORD and RANKIN will also be qualified by the following factors:-

(i) Political. The extent to which Allied unity is maintained and to which the political aims of the United Nations are clearly defined and are accepted by the peoples of Europe.

(ii) Bombing. The extent to which morale considerations are taken into account in the implementation of bombing policy.

(iii) Deception. The extent to which morale factors are taken into consideration in the formulation of deception plans. (A deception plan based upon purely military considerations might prove to be a boomerang from a morale point of view, since it might create premature action before D-day or discredit authentic instructions at D-day.)

IV. AIMS In cooperation with the United Nations Armed Forces and all competent departments;

1. So to affect the will of the German People and of the German Armed Forces as to make them refuse to continue the war.

2. To cause the Satellites to abandon Germany in circumstances which will assist OVERLORD.

3. To complete the process of enlisting, preparing and mobilising the Peoples of Occupied Countries for action within the framework of United Nations plans in such a way as to render maximum assistance to OVERLORD and RANKIN.

4. To create maximum goodwill towards, and identification with, the United Nations cause among the Peoples of Neutral Countries. (This, in British practice, is a Ministry of Information function.)

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The objectives and themes supporting these aims are stated in Annex I. and cognate objectives coordinated with E.O.P./O.S.P. in Annex II.

The weekly directives of P.W.E. and O.W.I. are the machinery for current implementation.

The above aims are basically those pursued by the British and American authorities in the European theatre up to the present time. They will be brought to a climax by the contingencies contemplated. The extent to which they are achieved will be conditioned by the degree of political and military success attained by United Nations between now and D-day.

V. MEANS

A. Preliminary and Preparatory Phases. From a Political Warfare point of view these are identical except as regards tempo.

During these phases, P.W.E. and O.W.I. will:

1. Harness their regular media, e.g. radio broadcasts, leaflets, publications, rumours, etc. to the task of achieving the aims and objectives laid down in Annex I. by exploiting to the full the supporting themes listed therein.
2. Make the maximum use of covert radio and covert leaflets to the same effect.
3. Support the subversive and sabotage activities which will be carried out by the duly authorised agencies in enemy and enemy occupied territories.
4. Assist, in consultation with the authorities concerned, and to the extent required, in implementation of bombing policy and deception plans.
5. Recruit and train personnel for front line and rear echelon Political Warfare.

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6. Build up the necessary stocks of Political Warfare equipment and trained personnel for the countries to be liberated.

7. Assist the competent authorities in the preparation of proclamations, instructions, etc. for D-day.

B. D-day (Assault Plan)

On D-day, whether as scheduled for OVERLORD or brought about by RANKIN, P.W.E. and O.W.I. will:-

1. Broadcast and disseminate by leaflet such proclamations or instructions as may be issued by the Supreme Allied Commander and the highest United Nations Political authorities.

2. Issue whatever instructions the Supreme Allied Commander requires to:-

(a) areas of the same country not involved in the immediate operation;

(b) other Occupied Countries not immediately involved.

3. Organise and stimulate, in conjunction with the authorities concerned (see Annex II) strikes, guerilla action and armed uprisings behind the enemy lines in the area involved in military operations.

4. Put into effect in conjunction with the authorities concerned (see Annex II) the tactical plans for the confusion of the enemy, the destruction of his will to resist, the disruption of his communications, the destruction of his supplies, etc.

NOTE 1. The above applies to OVERLORD or RANKIN (a), but (3) and (4) are either incomplete or require modification in connection with RANKIN (b) and (c).

NOTE 2. Political Warfare, in the geographical context of OVERLORD, will be exercised in four areas:-

- (a) Liberated zone.
- (b) Combat zone.
- (c) Unliberated zones.
- (d) Germany and Satellite Territories.

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NOTE 3. The aims, objectives and themes in Annex 1, will continue to be operative in areas (b), (c) and (d), while in area (a) the chief aim will be to consolidate goodwill and enlist active support.

C. After capture of Initial Objectives and Subsequent to D-day plus 90.

Plans for this phase cannot be formulated until the exact intentions of the political and military authorities are known. These, in turn, will be dependent upon the degree of initial military success achieved.

VI. CHANGES

1. Whenever it becomes necessary to effect changes in the approved themes already embodied in the COSSAC plan, one of the following procedures will become operative:

(a) P.W.E.-O.W.I. will, on their own initiative in consultation with S.A.C., effect the necessary changes in their Central or in Special Directives.

(b) S.A.C., on his own initiative, will suggest feasible changes to be incorporated in P.W.E.-O.W.I. Central and Special Directives

(c) For emergency or contingency decisions, L.P.C. will issue Special Directives.

VII. INFORMATION

1. The releasing of information dealing with the initiation of major phases of the operation must be the function of S.A.C. In drafting the form in which the information is released, it will be essential that the requirements of P.W. as opposed to those of public relations and censorship, should be taken into full consideration. Directly S.A.C. has made known his wishes, P.W.E. and O.W.I. will give full publicity to the proper audiences by all media including radio announcements and, whenever possible, leaflets.

5th October, 1943.

TOP SECRETPOLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVEReference P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for
Political Warfare (= U.S. Psychological Warfare)

With reference to my Most Secret minute of the 8th inst.,
COSSAC has requested that the following further additions be
made to the above Plan:-

1. Add in the parenthesis under item 1 of Themes Sup-
porting Objective (b) (page 1* of Annex I) the words
"European Advisory Council".
2. Add a parenthesis to item 8 of Themes Supporting
Objective (c) (page 2** of Annex I) the sentence "Care must
be exercised to permit no latitude either toward harsh-
ness nor a kindly feeling in developing this theme".

P. R. CHAMBERS, Col.,
for (Major-General)
Deputy Director-General,
P.W.E.

20th December, 1943.

*page 10 of this paper.
**Page 11 of this paper.

TOP SECRETO.V.E.F.F.O.R.DP.W.E./O.W.I. OUTLINE PLAN
FOR POLITICAL WARFARE (=G.I.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE)ANNEX IPROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMES
FROM NOW UNTIL D-DAY

AIM ONE. SO TO AFFECT THE WILL OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES AS TO MAKE THEM REFUSE TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

OBJECTIVES:

(a) To make the German People and the Armed Forces recognise that their defeat is a present reality.

(b) To make the German People recognise that unconditional surrender is our irreducible demand and that there is no possibility of splitting the United Nations on this or any other issue.

(c) To make the German People realise that all they can accomplish by prolonging the war is to make it worse for themselves, not only during but after the war, and that the consequences of unconditional surrender will be more bearable than the consequences of continuing the war.

(d) To dispel the fear of the German terror machine.

(e) To produce pressure for ending the war by arousing mass resentment among the Germans against their political and military leaders, and by appropriate stimulation of the foreign workers (through themes to Occupied Countries).

THEMES.

Supporting Objective

(a) To make the German People and the Armed Forces recognise that their defeat is a present reality

1. Germany has lost the initiative since November 1942.
2. Germany has lost the war in the air.
3. Germany has lost the war at sea.

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4. Germany is losing the war on land.
5. Germany has lost the political war (e.g. Tripartite Collapse - United Nations solidarity).
6. Germany has lost the economic war (e.g. Production and Manpower).
7. German leaders realise that Germany has lost the war.

Supporting Objective

(b) To make the German People recognise that unconditional surrender is our irreducible demand and that there is no possibility of splitting the United Nations on this or any other issue.⁷

1. United Nations solidarity in the political field (e.g. recognition of the F.N.C.L., Mediterranean Commission, Three Power Conference).
2. United Nations co-operation in the economic field (e.g. Lease-Lend).
3. United Nations unity in the field of military strategy.
4. United Nations community of interests in post-war planning (e.g. Atlantic Charter, U.N.R.R.A., etc.)

Supporting Objective

(c) To make the German People realise that all they can accomplish by prolonging the war is to make it worse for themselves, not only during, but after the war, and that the consequences of unconditional surrender will be more bearable than the consequences of continuing the war.⁷

1. United Nations strength makes a successful defensive war impossible for Germany.
2. The longer the war, the greater the human suffering and material destruction. The greater the destruction of German industry (e.g. by bombing), the greater the difficulty of reconstruction.
3. The longer the war, the more difficult it will be for Germany to be reconstituted as an accepted member of the family of nations.

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4. The longer the Germans continue the war and their oppression of the Occupied Peoples, the longer will they postpone relief for themselves. Our first responsibility is to our Allies, particularly to those who have been plundered, starved and enslaved by the Nazi regime.

5. The example of Sicily and Italy and the activities of the Mediterranean Commission upon which Russia is represented.

6. United Nations' leaders assurances that they will not be party to mass reprisals but will insist upon stern punishment of the guilty.

7. Evidence of good treatment from prisoners of war.

8. The traditional just treatment of a beaten enemy by Anglo-Saxon peoples.

9. It is in the interests of the United Nations that Germany, stripped of Nazism and traditional militarism, be reconstituted as a member of the family of nations and share peacefully in the prosperity of the post-war world.

10. Unconditional surrender means that never in the lifetime of any living German will a German boy go off to war again.

Supporting Objective

(d) To dispel the fear of the German terror machine.⁷

1. The terror machine is being weakened by casualties, dispersal, and doubts as to its own powers and effectiveness.

2. The terror machine can function only so long as it is accepted by the German people.

3. The increasing brutality of the terror machine is evidence of its anxiety and weakness.

4. Examples of successful resistance to the terror machine by the peoples of Occupied Countries.

Supporting Objective

(e) To produce pressure for ending the war by arousing mass resentment among the Germans against their political and military leaders, and by appropriate stimulation of the foreign workers (through themes to Occupied Countries).⁷

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1. The German leadership was guilty of leading the German people into a war of aggression.
2. The military, political and economic blunders of the German leadership.
3. The German leadership destroyed the best values of German civilization.
4. The German leadership has feathered its own nest at the expense of the people and of the national interest.
5. The German leadership is prolonging the war solely to save its own skin.

AIM TWO. TO CAUSE THE SATELLITES TO ABANDON GERMANY.

OBJECTIVES:-

- (a) To convince the Satellites that Germany's defeat is a present reality.
- (b) to convince the Satellites that the consequences of sharing in Germany's defeat are immeasurably worse than the consequences of a prompt surrender to the United Nations, and that there is no third course open to them.
- (c) To make the Satellitees conscious that they are already within the reach of United Nations military power.
- (d) To convince the Satellites that Germany will not and cannot defend them, but will try to make them battlegrounds for the defence of Germany. (N.B. This does not apply to Finland).
- (e) To show Germany's decreasing power to enforce her will upon the Satellites.
- (f) To cause the peoples of the Satellite Countries to sabotage the German war effort, bring pressure upon their Governments to get out of the war, or overthrow their Governments if they resist such pressure. (N.B. The timing of this will vary for each country).
- (g) To dispel both the Bolshevik Bogy and the fear of Anglo/U.S.A./U.S.S.R. imperialism by demonstrating Anglo/U.S.A./U.S.S.R. community of interests and adherence to the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter.

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(h) To dispel hopes of splitting the United Nations on the settlement of Eastern Europe.

THEMES:-

Supporting Objective

(a) To convince the Satellites that Germany's defeat is a present reality.

Same as themes supporting Objective (a) of Aim One.

Supporting Objective

(b) To convince the Satellites that the consequences of sharing in Germany's defeat are immeasurably worse than the consequences of a prompt surrender to the United Nations, and that there is no third course open to them.

1. The longer they stick with Germany, the greater their human suffering and material destruction.

2. The longer they stick with Germany, the longer will they be exploited and impoverished for Germany's benefit.

3. The longer they stick with Germany, the longer will they postpone their own relief and rehabilitation.

4. The sooner they surrender, the sooner will their countries be reconstituted as accepted members of the family of nations.

Supporting Objective

(c) To make the Satellites conscious that they are already within the reach of United Nations military power.

1. Ploesti and similar examples as available.

2. The growing strength of patriot forces of the United Nations close to the frontiers.

Supporting Objective

(d) To convince the Satellites that Germany will not and cannot defend them, but will try to make them battlegrounds for the defence of Germany. (N.B. This does not apply to Finland).

1. The example of Italy, because it allowed the Germans to disperse Italian forces outside Italy and failed to organise national resistance to the Germans in time.

2. The probability that, if they stick with Germany, their peoples will be sacrificed as were their troops on the Russian battlefield.

Supporting Objective

(e) To show Germany's decreasing power to enforce her will upon the Satellites.

1. Same as themes supporting Objective (d)
2. The decrease of Germany's armed strength makes her both less able to back her demands by force and more dependent upon the Satellites.
3. Examples of Germany's failure to enforce her full demands upon Satellite or even upon Occupied Countries.

Supporting Objective

(f) To cause the peoples of the Satellite Countries to sabotage the German war effort, bring pressure upon their Governments to get out of the war or overthrow their Governments if they resist such pressure. (N.B. The timing of this will vary for each country.)

1. Campaigns to encourage sabotage of transport, withholding of manpower, hoarding of crops, etc.

2. Promotion of dissension and explicit or implicit stimulation of all democratic groups.

3. The Satellite Governments are continuing in Germany's war at the expense of their peoples either to serve their own interests or because they lack skill and courage to reverse their course.

4. The Satellites must "work their passage home". They will be judged by their actions and by the degree to which they help to shorten the war.

5. Mutatis Mutandis, same as themes supporting Objective

(d) of Aim One.

Supporting Objectives

(g) To dispel both the Bolshevik Bogy and the fear of Anglo/U.S.A./U.S.S.R. imperialism by demonstrating Anglo/U.S.A./Soviet community of interests and adherence to the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter. and

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(h) To dispel hopes of splitting the United Nations on the settlement of Eastern Europe.

Same as themes 1, 2, 3 and 4 supporting Objective (g) of Aim One.

AIM THREE. TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF ENLISTING, PREPARING AND MOBILISING THE PEOPLES OF THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN WORKERS IN ENEMY TERRITORY, FOR ACTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF UNITED NATIONS PLANS.

OBJECTIVES.

- (a) To sustain morale.
- (b) To maintain discipline and, while combating "attentisme", to avoid premature overt action.
- (c) To ensure disciplined co-operation of the whole people in all degrees from passive to para-military in conformity with the requirements of the United Nations.
- (d) To stimulate the peoples of the Occupied Countries to prepare themselves for future voluntary co-operation as independent members of the family of nations.

THEMES:

Supporting Objective

(a) To sustain morale.

1. The United Nations are winning the war. (Militarily, politically and economically).

2. The peoples of the Occupied Countries are in the forefront of the armies of liberation of which the foreign workers are the advance guard.

3. The Occupied Nations through their armed forces and resources outside Occupied Territory are already making a major contribution towards winning the war.

4. Each Occupied Nation will deal with its own quislings and collaborationists.

5. This is the last winter before liberation.

6. We are aware that future leadership is already being created within the Occupied Countries.

N.B. Policy towards Governments in exile and recognised authorities cannot be defined in an overall plan but will be dealt with in regional plans.

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Supporting Objective:

(b) To maintain discipline and, while combating "attempts" to avoid premature overt action.

1. The effective work done by organized resistance movements (Cross-reporting to the Occupied Countries).
2. The German plan is to break up the resistance movements by provoking them to expose themselves by premature overt action.
3. The Occupied Peoples, as part of the army of liberation, will receive unmistakable instructions at the proper time (Avis, etc.)

Supporting Objective

(c) To ensure disciplined co-operation of the whole people in all degrees from passive to para-military in conformity with the requirements of the United Nations.

1. Stimulation of undetectable sabotage against transport and communications.
2. Stimulation of the withholding of food from the Germans.
3. Stimulation of administrative sabotage.
4. Stimulation of evasion of labour conscription and slow-down of forced labour.
5. Support of para-military activity by patriot groups where consistent with United Nations plans.
6. Demoralisation of German troops.

Supporting Objective

(d) To stimulate the peoples of the Occupied Countries to prepare themselves for future voluntary co-operation as independent members of the family of nations.

1. Reaffirmation of United Nations determination that each people shall freely choose its own ultimate form of government, provided it is not a fascist form or a tyranny which might endanger peace.

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2. We are aware that future leadership is already being created within the Occupied Countries.

3. We share and support the common hopes and aspirations of the people of the Occupied Countries.

4. Recognition that the sufferings and experiences of the Occupied Peoples have given them not only the right but the competence to make an important contribution to the reorientation of the post-war world.

5. Full explanation, with particular applicability to each country, of United Nations plans for relief and rehabilitation.

6. The United Nations will insist upon the restoration of all property looted or stolen from the Occupied Countries by whatever means.

AIR FOUR: TO CREATE THE MAXIMUM GOODWILL TOWARDS AND IDENTIFICATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CAUSE AMONG THE PEOPLES OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. (N.B. This in British practice is a Ministry of Information function.)

OBJECTIVES:

- (a) To ensure resistance to eventual enemy aggression.
- (b) To ensure continued neutrality where it is in the interests of the United Nations military policy.
- (c) To create an atmosphere favourable to such neutral countries entering the war on our side as the United Nations High Command wish to have do so.

THEMES:

Supporting all three Objectives:

- 1. The continued existence of the neutrals as free and independent nations depends upon a United Nations victory. So does their continued enjoyment of the four freedoms.
- 2. The sooner the war ends in a United Nations victory, the better for the peoples of the neutral countries.
- 3. Eventual United Nations victory is certain but it can be accelerated by the attitude and conduct of the neutrals.

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4. The post-war attitude of the United Nations towards the present neutrals will largely depend upon the conduct and attitude of the neutrals between now and the end of the war.

5. Theme 1, supporting Objective (d) under Aim Three.

Supporting Objective

(b) To ensure continued neutrality where it is in the interests of the United Nations military policy.⁷

1. German defeat is a present reality. (All seven themes supporting Objective (a) under Aim One.)

5th October 1943.

TOP SECRETOVERLORDP.W.E./O.W.I. OUTLINE PLAN
FOR POLITICAL WARFARE (*U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE)ANNEX IIJOINT P.W.E./O.W.I. AND S.O.E./O.S.S. POLITICAL WARFARE PLAN
IN SUPPORT OF P.W.E./O.W.I. OUTLINE PLAN

The activities considered in paragraphs (A) to (E) below will be undertaken jointly by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./O.S.S. as an extension of, and in conjunction with, the main P.W.E./O.W.I. Political Warfare campaign. The operations envisaged are, in fact, a continuation of current P.W.E./O.W.I. black and white propaganda themes, to be supplemented by use of agents and geared to the requirements of OVERLORD and the contingency of RANKIN. For convenience, each paragraph is divided into two parallel sections: Occupied Territories, and Germany.

A. PRELIMINARY PHASEOccupied Territories.

This is the period of organization and education of the civilian populations in occupied territories. Political Warfare will be planned and executed with the purpose of bringing about conditions considered essential for the success of OVERLORD: minimum enemy morale, optimum patriot morale. Should the contingency of RANKIN intervene, current activities would be accelerated and brought to a climax; but the preliminary work is identical for both operations.

The objects of this first phase fall under three main headings:

(1) To Injure the Enemy.

To supplement the specific S.O.E. operations built around the Resistance groups, the unorganized masses of the populations will be educated, trained and directed to undertake on and before D. day, destructive and negative actions leading to inter alia:

TOP SECRET

(a) Immobilization of enemy rail, road, telephone and telegraph communications,

(b) Undermining enemy troop morale,

(c) Confusion and diversions in enemy back areas,

(d) Guerilla activities,

(e) Promotion of strikes.

(For details of operations, see Appendix I.)

(ii) To Secure Maximum Aid for Allied Military Operations

The populations in general will be stimulated to assist the Allied military authorities, on the following broad lines:

(a) Utilization of inhabitants' local knowledge of enemy's dispositions, defences, dumps, etc.

(b) Utilization of local labour, skilled and unskilled, to supplement military personnel.

(c) Preservation and reconstitution of local records useful to the Allies.

(d) Preservation of food-stuffs, livestock, fuel, vehicles, etc.

(For details of operations, see Appendix II)

(iii) To secure the Morale of Civilian Populations, and to Guide their Opinion between now and D. day.

The success of the objects in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) is dependent on the maintenance of civilian morale at the highest possible level during the period of suspense between now and D. day. In addition to a general, educational campaign instructing the populations how to co-operate before and on D. day, we must counteract the depressing effects of another winter without invasion by a constant, over-riding morale-building theme. One factor will be especially stressed: we consider the populations as being our Allies, and we greatly rely on their disciplined and organized help before, during and after D. day.

(For details of operations, see Appendix III)

TOP SECRETGermany.

To assist the main Political Warfare campaign, it is proposed to concentrate on two principal and potential Fifth Columns inside Germany:

(a) conscripted Foreign Workers, with whom some activity has already been generated by S.O.E., will be further trained and organized by special agents before departure from their own countries. Defeatist talk, rumours, and general nerve-war against the German civilians will be the chief weapons.

(b) Todt Organization, now manned chiefly by foreign workers, will also be penetrated so as to undermine the morale of German troops, the S.D., the S.S., and Todt guards.

B. PREPARATORY PHASEOccupied Territories.

As D. day approaches, the tempo of all activities under A(1), (ii) and (iii) will be accelerated. A sense of urgency will be present in all white and black activities and media. Agents and missions in the field will be instructed to close the last gaps in their organizational and operational plans. In particular, undermining of troop morale, and confusion of the enemy, will enter the final stages and will be made as widespread as possible.

Germany.

Foreign workers in factories, and Todt workers, will be urged to voice subversive and defeatist views more freely, to slack, and ideally, to persuade their co-workers (in the former group) and their guards (in the latter group) to join them in "ca' canny" tactics and breaches of discipline.

C. ASSAULT PHASEOccupied Territories

Co-incident with the D. day official white announcements that "The invasion has begun," instructions will be issued to Resistance groups and agents to put into effect all operations

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designed To Injure the Enemy (cf. paragraph A(1)), and to act or prepare to act on those operations destined to Maximize Aid for Allied Military Operations (cf. paragraph A(1)).

Additional white and black instructions to the population through radio and leaflets will aim at giving final impetus to different degrees of destructive or constructive activity, according to proximity to the battle zone. Organized mass action, not mere mass disorder, will be the object, bearing in mind the inevitable political implications, and the possibility of reprisal measures by the enemy against civilians.

Germany.

During the first hours of the invasion it will probably not be practicable to instruct conscripted workers and Todt workers to stage strikes or break into open revolt. However, depending on the degree of impact registered by Allied successes on the German home front, some forms of agitation will be suggested, together with rumours, defeatist talk and general nerve-war.

D. PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT AFTER CAPTURE OF INITIAL OBJECTIVE

At this stage, activities will require to be sub-divided into three main areas:

(1) Allied Back Areas.

Consolidation of the liberated population so as to afford Maximum Aid for Allied Military Operations will be pursued. In particular, the day-by-day temperature of the population will require to be watched, assessed, and controlled, to encourage good elements and good thinking, and to dispel anti-Allied attitudes.

(ii) Enemy Back Areas

Activities To Injure the Enemy will continue to be promoted vigorously in remaining enemy back-areas. It can be expected that guerilla action will now be fairly widespread, with consequent casualties. The provision of morale-building (e.g. "success story") propaganda to these Groups and to the populations will thus become necessary.

TOP SECRET(iii) Germany.

Development of activities inside Germany will be dependent on the degree of unrest already achieved. Against this must be balanced the counter-measures taken by the S.D. and S.S. to curb the Trojan Horse. Detailed plans will, therefore, have to be formulated as the invasion proceeds.

E. PERIOD SUBSEQUENT TO D. DAY PLUS 20

Specific plans for Allied and Enemy back-areas, as well as Germany, will depend mainly on the extent of the successes scored by Allied arms. Encouragement of and assistance to Resistance groups in enemy-held territory will be a primary objective; disillusionment, by every available means, of troops, workers, and civilians inside Germany will probably enter the final phase.

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October 5th. 1943.

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX ITO INJURE THE ENEMYA. 1. Immobilization of Enemy Transport and Communications.

To supplement the large-scale, specific sabotage attacks against transport and communications prepared by S.O.E. for D. day, it is proposed to prepare for wholesale immobilization of enemy rail, road, telephone and telegraph facilities by thousands of simultaneous small acts of interruption, easily executed by untrained patriots. Tactically, this will turn to account the enormous numerical advantage possessed by the population over the occupying enemy, who cannot prevent, and only with difficulty repair, an infinite number of stoppages; technically, the simpler forms of mass sabotage are well within the powers of ordinary civilians; practically, the plan requires only the realization by the population of what is needed, and how to do it.

This objective can be achieved by combined white and black propaganda, beginning now and continuing until D. day. The total operation - population versus transport and communications - offers possibilities which seem to justify giving it high, if not absolute priority in the Joint P.W.R./O.W.I. Political Warfare.

A. 2. Undermining Enemy Morale, especially Troop Morale.

Unrest, the Russian front, the bombing of the Reich, and now Italy, are known to be having profound psychological effects on the minds of the individual German soldiers. The time was never riper to attempt the systematic undermining of their morale. But this is a plan worth carrying out only if done on a considerable scale; specially trained organising agents are required in the chief German troop centres of Western Europe.

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The main lines of psychological attack (equally valid against land troops, Luftwaffe and U-boat crews) are designed to worry and exasperate the troops and troops, to commit them little by little to breaches of discipline, to attack "personal morale" as husbands, fathers, and human beings.

The attacks must be local, topical and personal. This presupposes complete local intelligence, organised by the agents, and covering every aspect of the enemy's military and private life. Selected local inhabitants, normally in direct contact with troops, will be used as conscious and unconscious tools. Methods will include: boycotting, petty pilfering of equipment, libelling of individual officers, interruption of Felipost, rumours, anonymous letters, black propaganda, leaflets, and radio, on themes such as: 1918 parallel, bomb damage "at home": the coming betrayal by "scab list s", dangers of plague, best methods of malingering.

On D. day, this softening-up process will be accelerated by more open methods, and direct appeals, through all media, to desert and surrender.

A. Confusion and Deception of Enemy, Distraction of Enemy Forces.

Confusion of the enemy's security, police and administrative services, rather than confusion on a strategic level, is proposed here. The circulation of basic rumours, by agents and black radio among German units whose morale will already be greatly weakened, can be an important contribution towards the wholesale breakdown of discipline and organisation.

Rumours can be supplemented by more tangible efforts: the simultaneous removal or changing of sign posts and road numbers by the population; the issue of false and forged movement orders for troops and material; false signs such as "Road Mined", etc. White and black media can educate the population before D. day. In addition, agents will be required for rumour-rongering and certain general operations.

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A. 4. Guerrilla Activities - Attacks on Grounds, Airfields, Attacks on Enemy Headquarters.

Apart from specific para-military operations organized by S.O.E. and the resistance groups, numerous opportunities will occur on D. day for spontaneous action by unorganized groups, provided they are educated in what to do and how to do it. Since the enemy will be surprised in time and place, rather than in method, propaganda through white and black media between now and D. day, appears both practical and desirable. Such propaganda would also serve to counteract apathy and educate the population as to their potential power. In addition, agents will be required as "reserves" for organized groups whose leaders may suffer repressive enemy action on D. day, and to lead hitherto unorganized patriots.

A. 5. Stirring up Trouble and Strikes among workers in German Occupied Territory.

Co-incident with D. day, it is probable that spontaneous and unauthorized strikes will occur in many areas. This operation will make capital of this condition and attempt to organize the unorganized, i. e. groups other than transport workers, miners, civil servants, etc.

In addition to S.O.E. contacts, some agents will be required as regional organizers. Black and white radio and leaflets will educate and give further support.

A. 6. Destruction of Records Useful to the Enemy. Such lists of workers, Livestock, Radios, etc.

The enemy's administrative control of occupied areas is largely dependent on records of manpower, resources and equipment. His system is complex and "mechanised". Destruction of certain types of records will burden his control of civilian elements, throw his system into confusion at a crucial moment.

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Black propaganda will be directed towards medium and low grade civil servants and fonctionnaires, both enemy and native. The population generally will not be encouraged to commit wholesale arson (burning the Town Hall) as this would conflict with Objective B. 6. (Preservation of Records useful to the Allies).

A. 7. Depriving the Enemy of Stocks of Food, Fuel, Ammunition and Other Material.

Specific operations under this heading must be the subject of major S.O.E. inspired sabotage or guerrilla action. However, it is envisaged that considerable support can be given by populations in the way of pilfering, damaging, mis-directing, contaminating, etc., enemy stores and equipment.

Between now and D. day, white media will stress successful examples by patriots in other countries, black media will support white by giving explicit instructions for various kinds of stores.

A. 8. Depriving the Enemy of Political and Administrative Services of Collaborators.

The destruction of traitors' morale has long been a primary P.W.E./S.O.E. objective, and much successful work performed. The aim of this particular operation is two-fold; to nullify the hard core of traitors who may stand by the enemy on D. day, and to bring such pressure on them before D. day that some at least will betray their masters.

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX IITO SECURE MAXIMUM AID FOR ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONSB. 1. Utilization of Population's Local Knowledge of Enemy's Military Dispositions, Defences, Dumps, etc.

Except in militarized zones closed to civilians, the enemy cannot conceal his dispositions from the local population. Thus, there is a vast store of vital local and detailed intelligence available, provided it is offered in a selective form and is demonstrably reliable. To facilitate the tasks of Allied Intelligence officers, educational propaganda is proposed mainly through white radio and leaflets. To suggest such intelligence activities to the population has a further advantage beyond direct military utility: it will increase the enemy's feeling of being surrounded by hostile elements, may possibly impose extra and inconvenient (and always inadequate) security measures, and will give the populations safe and constructive work in the period of suspense before D. day.

B. 2. Utilization of Population's knowledge of Topography.

This operation is basically an extension of objective B. 1., but with an added purpose: to assure a supply of competent, reliable civilian guides when military operations begin. Direct appeals by white radio and leaflets to specific, likely categories, such as postmen, Boy Scouts, ex-soldiers, gendarmes, etc., are envisaged.

B. 3. Utilization of Local Labour Resources, Skilled and Unskilled, to Supplement Military Personnel.

Like objectives B. 1. and B. 2., this operation would serve to educate workers in general as to what will be required of them during, and immediately after D. day. Lorry-drivers, garage hands, builders, dockers and others can give active

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assistance to Pioneer companies in unloading stores and repairing enemy demolitions, provided these groups know in advance that they will be needed. Educational propaganda, in white media, is again envisaged.

B. 4. Utilization of Local Personnel for First-Aid, Fire Fighting, A.R.P. and Public Services.

Apart from the negative line we wish employees of public services to follow and which they probably understand well, e.g. to serve the enemy as badly as possible and to preserve themselves and their plant, it seems desirable to promote group activity of individuals, (First Aid, A.R.P., etc.) to steady and maintain mass morale through the dangerous and uncomfortable period of D. day and immediately after. An overt educational campaign by white leaflets and radio is indicated. Results cannot be 100% but neither can they be nil. In addition, the organisation of such Civil Defence groups is an activity to which the enemy cannot very well object, even though he may suspect that such groups might perform selective sabotage on D. day by failing to put out strategic fires, etc.

B. 5. Utilization of Loyal Local Administrative and Police Personnel.

Because P.W.E. is charged with the preparation and distribution of "Black Lists" for D. day operations, it appears desirable to extend to the populations generally the already widespread activity being undertaken by S.O.E., S.I.S., and Resistance Group agents of collecting evidence for and against local officials. All propaganda media will be used to exploit fully the possibilities of 'unorganised counter-espionage.'

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B. 6: Preservation, and Reconstitution of Records Useful to Allied Administration.

This operation is the positive counterpart of operation A. 6. (Destruction of Records). The distinction between what is useful to the Allies and useful to the enemy can be partially made by differentiating between purely German and purely local records, e.g. lists of conscripted workers maintained in local German H.Q.s. as opposed to lists of ration-book holders, in the Town Hall. Apart from direct educational work by agents, the distinctions can be elaborated through black radio and leaflets, supported in a more general way by white media.

B. 7. Preservation of Food Stuffs, Livestock, Fuel, Vehicles, etc.

For some time this theme has been a large part of P.W.E. appeals on white and black media, to peasants and civilians in occupied countries, with special reference to withholding portions of the harvest. Separate and more highly concentrated campaigns, using all possible propaganda forms will supplement the more direct efforts of agents to organize the hiding (and if necessary, the buying) of non-perishable commodities.

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APPENDIX IIITO SECURE THE MORALE OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS BETWEEN NOW AND D-DAY
TO GUIDE THEIR PUBLIC OPINION AND DIRECT THEIR ACTIVITIESC. 1. Propagation of a Realistic Understanding of what is involved,
for the Civilian Population, in an Allied Invasion.

This is not one, but in fact, several operations, so inter-related that they are grouped under a single general heading. In preparation for D-day it will be vital to keep up the spirits of and educate the occupied populations as to their roles:

- (i) To survive the invasion with as little loss and suffering as possible.
- (ii) To cause maximum trouble, obstruction and demoralisation to the enemy (Objectives A. 1-8).
- (iii) Actively to help Allied military forces (Objectives B. 1-7).

The problem is complex, but several points stand out. We must first make it plain that we expect and are sure, between now and D-day, of the practical cooperation of the population, whom we regard as Allies. We must aim at presenting as clearly as possible a picture in so far as it can be forecast. We must fit every specific request into, or at least make it consistent with, the general picture we present.

Between now and D-day, it will be necessary to undertake a constant and consistent large-scale educational and morale-building effort on the above lines. To present such a mass of information, instruction and advice as a coherent whole, radio (with its limitations of transmission time and difficulty of reception) and leaflets (equally limited) cannot be relied upon to keep and maintain the various themes in clear perspective. It is, therefore, proposed to use these media as strong support for one comprehensive basic booklet which will require the widest possible distribution, even at the sacrifice of other leaflets, between now and D-day. Black radio and leaflets can

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elaborate on subjects which it would be impolitic (for fear of enemy reprisals against civilians and prisoners) to discuss openly in a white publication.

In addition to the basic booklet, other white and black leaflets will summarise information on: self-preservation theme; enemy morale theme; sabotage; aid for the Allies, etc.

C. 2. Securing Information necessary for Direction of Propaganda to, and Relations with, Civil Populations.

Situations experienced by P.W.E. in the past have shown up the difficulties of collecting and collating intelligence from its own and other sources and keeping the material so up-to-date that accurate analysis or inference can be assured. In the planning of Political Warfare and propaganda to about-to-be liberated populations, it will be especially necessary to provide machinery to give accurate (almost mathematical) qualitative sampling of opinion on such subjects as: who are locally accepted leaders; how much has potential resistance been lowered by malnutrition; is local Communism ideological or the result of groupings within the resistance movements? To secure such machinery will require the organisation by agents of investigators and informants on the lines of "public opinion polls." Results, made available to all interested intelligence organisations will have considerable value during current operations; they will have an ever-increasing importance to D.C.A. and civil organisations in established occupation areas.

C.3. Distribution of News and Instructions to Civilian Populations

Until D-day, the supplying of news to occupied territories largely devolves on the B.B.C. and other Allied broadcasting systems and on leaflets distributed by the Anglo-American Air Forces. Instructions to Resistance groups mainly originate with S.O.E. or the Exiled Governments. On D-day itself, the likelihood of severe German repressive measures to jam or interrupt

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both overt and covert communications from this country must be taken into account. If only partially successful, such measures will cut off large numbers of the civil populations and may isolate Resistance groups from control here, leading them to formulate independent actions. To counteract these possibilities it will be of the utmost importance to ensure communications with the Continent (possibly based on Morse signals), and at the same time to exercise as much control as possible on the Resistance groups, by equipping them as emergency disseminators of news as well as instructions.

C. 4. Establishment and Maintenance of Contact.

Contact, as considered here, is with groups of civil populations for the purpose of supplying leadership elements to not yet organised communities. Whilst this appears to be primarily a S.O.E. function, agents specially trained for sabotage are not necessarily suitable for contact and organisational work. Because of considerable dependence on local recruiting, and training, there is a special need for psychological conditioning of trainees through printed and spoken black media, the distribution of which could be locally controlled.

~~SECRET~~JOINT P.W.E./O.W.I. AND S.O.E./O.S.S.(S.O.)POLITICAL WARFARE PLAN

(In support of P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan)

INTRODUCTION

1. The following Regional Summaries for FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND, NORWAY and DENMARK have been prepared by and agreed between the various Country Sections of P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./O.S.S.(S.O.). These Summaries will be used as guidance notes in planning and carrying out in the above-mentioned Occupied Territories the operations described in Appendices I, II and III of Annex II of the P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for Political Warfare (- U.S. Psychological Warfare).

2. Attention is drawn to the "APPRECIATION" in each Summary, which shows that the planning and implementation of the operations are largely dependant on two factors:

- (a) Securing full collaboration of the relevant Government-in-Exile (or National Committee);
- (b) Securing an adequate number of nationals of the various countries, to be trained and despatched as agents.

3. These requirements, which are now urgent, will necessitate the intervention of C.O.S.S.A.C. either direct, or, through the Foreign Office; they are recapitulated below, country by country:

- (a) FRANCE: Potential agents can only be secured through the Conseil de la Resistance. It may be necessary for C.O.S.S.A.C. to intervene on behalf of P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./O.S.S.(S.O.) to secure this co-operation if preliminary meetings, to be held shortly with the Conseil, prove inconclusive.

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(b) BELGIUM: It will be necessary for the Foreign Office to be invited to draw the attention of the Belgian Government to the importance of their making available to the Belgian Surete the necessary number of agents; the Surete would welcome such intervention as they have difficulty in persuading their own authorities to permit the release of men from the Belgian armed forces.

(c) HOLLAND: Direct requests for collaboration with the Netherlands Government are now being made by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./O.S.S.(S.O.): If the negotiations are protracted, it will be necessary for the Foreign Office to be invited to support these requests.

(d) NORWAY: Intervention by C.O.S.S.A.C. with the Norwegian Government is a pre-requisite to the establishment of satisfactory co-operation between the latter and P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./O.S.S.(S.O.).

(e) DENMARK: Since there is no Government-in-Exile, no action by C.O.S.S.A.C. is required.

4. Until action has been taken along the above lines, no real progress can be made in setting up the required organisation in the field. In the opinion of P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./O.S.S.- (S.O.), unless these facilities become available during the month of December, there will be insufficient time properly to organise and execute these operations.

- 0 -

26th November, 1943.

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Introduction

TOP SECRETJOINT P.W.E./O.W.I. AND S.O.E./S.G.POLITICAL WARFARE PLANRegional Summary - FRANCE

(General Note: This paper, jointly drafted by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.G., will be used as guidance by those Departments when translating, from the general into the particular, the terms of the P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for Political Warfare, Annex II with Appendices I, II, and III. The paper should therefore, be read and considered as a commentary on the operational Appendices.)

1. APPRECIATION

The operations described in Appendices I, II and III of the Joint Plan are feasible, provided that the following two essential conditions are fulfilled:

- (a) That full co-operation of the Conseil de la Resistance is requested, and obtained;
- (b) That a clear distinction be maintained between specific "professional" S.O.E./S.G. tasks and targets, and the more general activities to be organised and inspired by P.W.E./O.W.I. among the "non-professional" French masses.

As regards (a). only with the co-operation of the Conseil will it be possible to secure the relatively large numbers of agents required to implement the Plan; further, even if agents were available through P.W.E. and S.O.E. sources, these men could only establish authority over the masses in France with the backing and co-operation of the local Resistance groups. Lastly, the selection, training, and placing of agents will be greatly accelerated if the Conseil instructs Resistance group leaders to recruit and train agents in the field, to supplement the relatively very small number that can be trained in Great Britain.

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It is proposed, therefore, to prepare an outline paper, dealing with the main factors and operations contained in the Plan, for discussion with the Conseil on the basis that the proposed activities are the normal winter programme of P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. in the political warfare field, but that the possibility of the operations being linked to the plans for an eventual Allied invasion should logically be envisaged.

As regards (b), it has been agreed that S.O.E./S.O. will divulge to P.W.E./O.W.I. sufficient details of the "professional" sabotage and guerrilla plans, so that the organisation of, and propaganda to, the "non-professional" masses will lead to, as far as possible, entirely separate but complementary action in the field on D.-day and thereafter.

2. COMMENTS ON APPENDICES I, II AND III

A. 1. Immobilisation of Enemy Transport - The population will be encouraged to take all possible action on roads, against moving and parked vehicles, against small car parks and small petrol depots. "Non-professional" action against the following will be discouraged: all railway lines and installations; important petrol depots, all telephone and telegraph lines and centres until after D.-day.

A. 2. Undermining Troop Morale - Limited work, with some positive results, has already been undertaken by P.W.E. and S.O.E. Plans for intensification are in hand, but are largely dependent on securing properly trained agents from the Conseil. S.O.E./S.O. undertake to deliver propaganda material to, and initiate distribution from the following places: Paris, Bordeaux, Clermont Ferrand, Lyons, Nice, Toulouse, Rennes.

(Note 1: These centres can, and will be, used as distribution points for other political warfare material called for in the joint operations.)

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A. 3. Confusion of the Enemy - The Council will be asked to provide special organisers in the field, who will also brief selected sub-agents. Instructions to agents organising the population will be in broad, general terms, and every effort will be made to prevent "confusion" which the enemy might be able to turn against our forces. S.O.E./S.O. agents, having already been given their specific Deception tasks, will be kept entirely separate from these activities, unless, in certain instances, a linking-up is agreed to be desirable.

A. 4. Guerrilla Activities - In view of extensive guerrilla activities for D.-day inspired and directed by S.O.E./S.O., P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda and organisational work will stress the following points: individuals who, on D.-day, wish to perform guerrilla activities, and have the arms, should form their own independent bands if they do not belong to already organised groups; they should not attempt to attach themselves to other bands which they may see in their neighbourhood; they should not attempt attacks against grounded aircraft, well-guarded transport or tank parks, important petrol depots, or well-protected German military H.Q.'s, but should, as much as possible, attack only isolated units, small installations, and ill-protected military H.Q.'s. To avoid German reprisals, efforts will be made to restrict independent guerrilla activities to districts not so far removed from the battle area as to make their activities so dangerous as to be useless.

A. 5. Stirring up Strikes - Detailed plans and instructions for D.-day can only be elaborated after consultation with the Council, which will be required to divulge the extent of their own plans and those of the C.G.T. However, it should be noted that many French workers do not belong to established trades unions; agents outside the C.G.T. but having connections with it, will be required to influence the non-union groups.

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A. 6. Destruction of Records - To supplement specific S.O.E./S.O. tasks, it is intended that P.W.E./O.W.I. appeals and instructions should encourage concealment rather than outright destruction. Present P.W.E./O.W.I. appeals will be elaborated after consultation with the Conseil and S.O.E./S.O.

A. 7. Depriving Enemy of Food Stocks - Destruction or hiding of foodstuffs is partly covered by S.O.E./S.O. activities envisaged for guerrillas when attacking military H.Q.'s and dumps. Previous P.W.E. instructions to farmers to deprive the Germans of crops and produce, will be continued, but the population will be discouraged from attacking large, well-guarded dumps.

A. 8. Depriving Enemy of Collaborators - This operation can be performed only with the full co-operation of the local Resistance groups, and therefore, through the Conseil. The importance of discouraging and avoiding personal vendettas is recognised. Ideally, the Resistance groups should formulate their own complete lists of collaborators which could be published or posted up on D.-day. The population would be instructed only to seek out those Quislings whose names appear on these "official" lists.

* * * * *

B. 1. 2. 3. 4. Utilisation of Population's Knowledge of -
Enemy Dispositions - Local Topography - Local Labour Resources -
Local Personnel for Public Services - Resistance Group agents are to some extent familiar with the necessity of ascertaining these facts; the briefing of agents in the field will, therefore, be extended, and agents will be provided with a basic directive for the further education of the population, which can be amplified through ordinary P.W.E./O.W.I. white and black radio and leaflets.

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B. 5. 6. 7. Utilization of Local Secret Service
Preservation of Records and Documents - These are the positive counterparts of A. 5, A. 6, and A. 7, and as such will be covered in the detailed planning and execution of these operations.

* * * * *

C. 1. Preparing the Population for an Allied Invasion
and what this Entails - The basic instructional and educational booklet, clearly defining the difference between "professional" and "non-professional" help and hindrance, will require the widest possible distribution between now and D.-day. This distribution will be effected through S.O.E./S.O. channels (as enumerated in A. 2.) and will be supplemented through Resistance Groups.

C. 2. Securing Information for Direction of Propaganda to Civilian Population - Political considerations render the co-operation of the Conseil impossible. While recognising the importance of this operation, its success must depend on securing agents wholly under P.W.E./O.W.I. control.

C. 3. Distribution of News and Instructions - Assuming the necessity on and after D.-day, of possessing emergency communication channels for dissemination of news and instructions independent of local power and current, use will be made of the S.O.E./S.O. network of some hundreds of battery receivers which will be in the field at that time. Arrangements will be completed, between P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. and the Conseil, for these listening-posts to distribute news bulletins where necessary to the local clandestine press, or alternatively, to produce their own emergency bulletins for public distribution.

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C. 4. Maintenance of Contact - In the event of a zone of civilian resistance in certain localities in addition to, or apart from, purely guerrilla activities, it may be necessary for P.W.E./O.W.I., in conjunction with the Conseil, to provide political warfare and propaganda guidance. A pool, in Great Britain, of specially trained agents will be required for these emergency duties.

* * * * *

(Note 2: Poles in France - Education and instruction of the French population will include material to the S.O.E./S.O. organised groups of Poles in Northern France. However, because these Poles are, so far, not compromised in subversive activities, all instructions will be issued in the French language. The operations in which the Poles can give greatest assistance are: A. 1. - Immobilisation of Transport; A. 2. - Undermining Troop Morale, concentrating on German troops of Polish origin; A. 4. - Guerrilla Activities; A. 5. - Stirring up Strikes.)

(Note 3: Preparatory Phase - Occupied Territories - The stipulation contained in the Plan that "as D.-day approaches, the tempo of all activities will increase, ... and a sense of urgency will be present in all black and white activities and media" should be taken to mean that the final state of preparedness which this acceleration is designed to create will be achieved without serving prior notice on agents, the population, or the enemy that military operations are impending.)

* * * * *

D. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS

(1) Agents:

Until the degree of collaboration obtainable from the Conseil has been ascertained, and an estimate of suitable Resistance group agents secured, no detailed list can be drawn up. It should be noted that the following operations are more particularly dependent on a sufficiency of trained agents:

France

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- A.1. - Immobilisation of Transport
- A.2. - Undermining Troop Morale
- A.3. - Confusion of the Enemy
- A.5. - Stirring up Strikes
- B.1, 2, 3, 4. - Utilisation of Populations!
local knowledge, etc.
- C.4. - Maintenance of Contact

The possible coverage by agents depends both on the proportionate strength of the Resistance groups in each locality and the suitability of available manpower; these subjects require close study in conjunction with the Conseil. It is assumed that one agent in one locality could readily undertake the organisation of several operations, thus effecting economy of manpower and communications.

(ii) Equipment and facilities required between now and D.-day.

Detailed estimates cannot be formulated until after discussions with the Conseil. However, the following general requirements can be anticipated. To obtain these, the authority and backing of C.O.S.S.A.C. will probably be necessary.

(a) Greatly increased aircraft facilities for dropping containers of purely P.W.E./O.W.I. material;

(b) Greatly increased dropping of white leaflets by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. on specific targets;

(c) Increase of S.O.E. communications (W/T) for instructions to, and receiving reports from, agents in the field.

4. CONCLUSION

As stated in the APPRECIATION, the implementation of the operations in the Plan is largely, if not wholly, dependant on securing agents through the Conseil de la Resistance. It may be necessary for C.O.S.S.A.C. to intervene on behalf of P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. to secure full co-operation of the Conseil; however, this contingency will not occur until after the preliminary discussions which will be held shortly with the Conseil.

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JOINT P.W.E./O.W.I. AND S.O.E./S.O.
POLITICAL WARFARE PLAN

Regional Summary - BELGIUM

(General Note: This paper, jointly drafted by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O., will be used as guidance by these Departments when translating from the general into the particular, the terms of the P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for Political Warfare, Annex II with Appendices I, II, and III. The paper should, therefore, be read and considered as a commentary on the operational Appendices.)

1. APPRECIATION

Collaboration on political warfare matters, in London and in the field, between P.W.E., S.O.E. and the Belgian authorities (the Government and the Surete) has been well developed during the past year. Ten joint P.W.E./S.O.E. missions have been despatched to Belgium for political warfare activities with the full approval of the Surete which has cooperated loyally in the selection of the agents (the Surete is the only source of recruits), as well as in the preparation and financing of the missions.

As a result of this collaboration, P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. and the Belgian Government are in complete agreement as to which clandestine organisations in Belgium should receive encouragement and support. The main political organisation is the "Front de l'Independance", a union of all pre-war political parties; most of the formations which, within this organisation, engage in active sabotage are Communist-controlled.

None of the joint missions is now in contact with purely para-military formations such as the former "Legion Belge", which has now been reorganised under the name of "L'Armee Belge". An emissary from S.O.E. and the Belgian "Zeme Section" (which deals with para-military activities) recently returned from

Belgium with a full report on this formation; as a result of this visit, the Belgian authorities are willing to foster this group and to give moral and financial support. P.W.E./O.M.I. and S.O.E./S.O. are in agreement since, although "L'Armee Belge" is not active in political warfare, its organisation is wide-spread and well-disciplined and can probably be used for the dissemination of leaflets and instructions, between now and D-day. Further, it is desirable that all para-military organisations should be acquainted with political warfare directives sent to political warfare organisations proper, so that misunderstandings in the field can be minimised, if not avoided entirely.

Contacts may also be developed for the purposes mentioned above with a third organisation, "Le Mouvement National Belge", which works in harmony with the "Front de l'Independance". Should this materialise, contact will be initiated and maintained in agreement with the Belgian authorities.

2. COMMENTS ON APPENDICES I, II AND III

Because of the well-developed political warfare activities during the past twelve months, many of the themes in Appendices I, II and III have already received treatment. Their development, in accordance with the terms of the Plan, requires extension and acceleration of present activities. In Appendix I, all themes with the exception of A.3 (Confusion and Diversion of the Enemy) and A.4 (Guerrilla Activities) have already received some development in black or white radio, or in both. Degree of emphasis and frequency of mention will require further planning.

In Appendix II, themes B.1 (Population's knowledge of Enemy Dispositions), B.2 (Population's knowledge of Topography) and B.7 (Preservation of Foodstuffs, etc.), have already been developed in black and white radio. The remaining themes can be started at an early date. However, it is expected that B.5 (Utilisation of Loyal Local Personnel) may meet with some opposition from Belgian authorities.

Belgium

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In Appendix III, theme C.1 (*General Propagation of Invasion Instructions*) is covered by remarks in paragraph 3(11) below; the main physical requirements for Objective C.3 (*Distribution of News and Instructions to the Population*) are indicated in paragraph 3(11) below; the remaining operations (C.2 and C.4) require further discussion and planning.

3. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS

(1) New agents required

Some difficulties are anticipated in securing the required number of new agents for the extension of the political warfare programme in Belgium, unless the Foreign Office intervenes with the Belgian Government to persuade the latter to release the necessary number of men to the Surete (see CONCLUSION)

New agents are required for the following operations:

| | | |
|--|--------------------------|----|
| (a) A.1 - Immobilisation of Transport: | Organisers | 2 |
| | W/T: | 2 |
| (b) A.5 - Stirring up Strikes: | Organisers | 2 |
| | W/T: | 2 |
| (c) Organisation of Belgian workers in Germany: | Organisers | 1 |
| | Assistants | 2 |
| | W/T: | 1 |
| (d) Dissemination of suggestions and instructions to the unorganised population: | Organisers | 4 |
| | (2 Flemish 2 Walloon) | |
| | W/T: | 2 |
| (e) Reserves for replacing eventual losses: | Organisers | 6 |
| | W/T: | 6 |
| <u>Totals:</u> | Organisers | 17 |
| | W/T: | 13 |

(Note: These agents are required to supplement the six organisations still in the field, which are specially trained for P.W.E. work, and one of which contains an S.O.E. sabotage mission.

These groups are:

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- (a) Tybal P.W.E. and S.O.E. work. Principal mission: liaison with "Front de l'Indépendance".
- (b) Samoyede Secret preparation of radio, printing and cinema for D-day. Organisation of V/T communications.
- (c) Othello An agricultural mission which should develop into a nation-wide organisation. The objects are to withhold supplies from the Germans and to use the black market for the supply of the population at reasonable prices.
- (d) Caracal Destruction of "Office National du Travail" records. Has also been distributing anti-German morale leaflets.
- (e) Gibbon Pigeon Post.
- (f) Mandrill Nation-wide organisation for undermining enemy morale.)

(iii) Equipment and Facilities required between now and D-day

Detailed estimates will be formulated after the forthcoming informal discussions between P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. with the Belgian authorities. However, the following general requirements can be anticipated. To obtain these, the authority and backing of C.O.S.S.A.C. will probably be necessary.

(a) Several hundred Emerson battery radio receivers; sufficient, in any case, for country-wide organised listening-posts.

(b) Greatly increased aircraft facilities for dropping containers of purely P.W.E./O.W.I. material.

(c) Greatly increased dropping of white leaflets by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. on specific targets.

(d) A small number of mobile printing units, with stocks of paper, ink, etc., and the necessary printing staffs, for use during Phase II of C.O.S.S.A.C. operations to produce:

1. Anti-German morale material
2. Local posters and announcements.

TOP SECRETCONCLUSION

It will be necessary to ask the Foreign Office to draw the attention of the Belgian Government to the importance of their making available the necessary number of men for work in the field. The Belgian Surete would welcome such intervention, as they encounter difficulty in persuading the Belgian authorities to order, or even permit, the release of men from the Armed Forces, which are almost their only source of recruits, now that escapees from the Continent or from North Africa are so few.

TOP SECRET

JOINT P.W.E./O.W.I. AND S.O.E./S.O.

POLITICAL WARFARE PLANRegional Summary - HOLLAND

(General Note: This paper, jointly drafted by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O., will be used as guidance by these Departments when translating from the general into the particular, the terms of the P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for Political Warfare, Annex II with Appendices I, II, and III. The paper should, therefore, be read and considered as a commentary on the operational Appendices.)

1. APPRECIATION

At the present time, only one P.W.E./S.O.E. agent is in the field, and there is an absence of reliable and detailed information available upon the various Resistance movements which are known to exist in Holland.

This state of affairs is due to a variety of causes, among which may be cited the following:

(i) The department in the Netherlands Government which corresponds to P.W.E., i.e. The Netherlands Information Bureau, has no contacts of its own with Holland, and its liaison with the Dutch Action Service which, in conjunction with S.O.E. has such contacts, is of the loosest.

(ii) Until recently, any contacts which there may have been between the clandestine press in Holland and the Netherlands Government in London were handled by the Dutch "I" Branch, in conjunction with S.I.S.; this further tended to keep such contacts divorced from those departments which could most easily and advantageously exploit them in an active rather than in a passive manner. Recent discussions between the departments concerned have, however, removed this obstacle to concerted P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. action.

(iii) Since personnel which are recruited by S.O.E. are obtained from the Dutch Forces through the Dutch Action Service, that department has, until now, insisted upon their being employed upon the more specific para-military tasks. Further,

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the availability of personnel suitable for sending to the field has been and is likely to remain small; the type of men who would be suitable for a joint P.W.E./G.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. mission is, in any case, difficult to find.

Discussions will shortly be held between P.W.E./G.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. on the one hand and the Dutch authorities, including the Dutch Action Service, on the other, on certain aspects of the Joint Plan, to ascertain what degree of collaboration will be forthcoming. Should these talks prove satisfactory, detailed joint plans, including the degree of Dutch participation, will then be formulated.

2. COMMENTS ON APPENDICES I, II, AND III

Owing to the lack of previous P.W.E. contact with the Dutch Action Service, as well as to lack of distribution channels and contact with the Dutch clandestine press, detailed comment upon the extent to which the proposed operations would be feasible in Holland cannot be made at this juncture. The objects are, in the main, clearly desirable but their implementation will be dependent to a very large extent upon their degree of acceptance by the Dutch Action Service.

3. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS

(i) Agents:

Assuming that the Dutch Action Service will accept the greater part of the Plan, the following minimum number of agents is required:-

| | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| (a) A.1.-Immobilisation of Transport | Organisers: 1 W/T: 1 |
| (b) A.2.-Undermining Enemy Morale | Organisers: 2 W/T: 1 |
| (c) A.5.-Stirring up Strikes | Organisers: 1 W/T: 1 |
| (d) C.1.-Dissemination of suggestions and instructions to the unorganised population | Organisers: 2 W/T: 2 |
| (e) Contact with the clandestine press | Organisers: 1 W/T: 1 |
| (f) Organisation of Dutch workers in Germany | Organisers: 1 W/T: 1 |
| (g) Reserves for replacing eventual losses in the field | Organisers: 2 W/T: 2 |
| Total | Organisers: 12 W/T: 11 |

TOP SECRET

(Note: Due to shortage of time and personnel, it may be necessary to use one W/T operator for more than one organiser, or even to combine two or more missions, until such time as further trained agents can be made available.)

(ii) Equipment and facilities required in the period between now and D.-day

Detailed estimates will be formulated after consultation between P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. with the Dutch authorities. However, the following general requirements can be anticipated. To obtain these, the authority and backing of C.O.S.S.A.C. will probably be necessary.

(a) Several hundred Emerson battery receivers; sufficient, in any case, for country-wide organised listening posts;

(b) Greatly increased aircraft facilities for dropping containers of purely P.W.E./O.W.I. material;

(c) Greatly increased dropping of white leaflets by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. on specific targets;

(d) A small number of mobile printing units, with stocks of paper, ink, etc., and the necessary printing staffs, for use during Phase II of C.O.S.S.A.C. operations, to produce:

1. Anti-German morale material
2. Local posters and announcements

4. CONCLUSION

At a later stage, it may be necessary to request the Foreign Office to support the direct requests for cooperation which will be made by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. to the Netherlands Government.

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26th November, 1943.

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JOINT P.W.E./O.W.I. AND S.O.E./S.G.POLITICAL WARFARE PLANRegional Summary - NORWAY

(General Note: This paper, jointly drafted by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.G., will be used as guidance by these Departments when translating, from the general into the particular, the terms of the P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for Political Warfare, Annex II with Appendices I, II, and III. The paper should, therefore, be read and considered as a commentary on the operational Appendices.)

1. APPRECIATION

The Norwegian Government regards all information, propaganda, and political warfare activities in Norway as being entirely its concern, as representative of the Norwegian people and the servant of the Home Front; the latter has always been, and continues to be, extremely jealous of what it considers "interference from outside" in Norwegian domestic matters. This attitude is given substance by virtue of an agreement concluded in 1940 between the Foreign Office and the Norwegian Government, by which the Norwegian authorities maintain effective control over all B.B.C. broadcasts in the Norwegian language (other than plain news bulletins). Efforts by P.W.E. to introduce joint discussions on radio policy have been abortive; the Norwegian authorities have remained adamant in their desire to keep full control. As to black radio, one black station did operate for a considerable period, but was forced to close down because, while P.W.E. disposes of the necessary technical resources, the Norwegian authorities refused to release the Norwegian staff necessary to continue these activities; such staff could only be secured in return for full control of the black station by the Norwegians, which is against P.W.E. policy.

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As a direct result of the Norwegian attitude, P.W.E./S.O.E. joint activities have been limited in scope. P.W.E. does maintain full control over R.A.F. leaflets, but R.A.F. operations over Norway are infrequent. In addition, some small quantities of leaflets are sent into Norway through channels controlled by the Norwegian authorities; additional small quantities are distributed in Norway without the knowledge of the Norwegian authorities, through S.O.E. channels, but this latter distribution is limited by the fact that S.O.E. are bound by agreement not to undertake activities in Norway without approval of the Norwegians.

P.W.E. has been able to effect a small amount of propaganda by the indirect method of indoctrinating, during the training period, S.O.E. agents sent to the field; but, the Norwegian authorities have refused to permit the despatch and operation of agents for the specific purpose of political warfare.

P.W.E./S.O.E. collaboration in the past has been as close as the difficult conditions allowed; any closer collaboration on the part of S.O.E. would have exposed that organisation to the risk of jeopardising its relations with the Norwegian authorities, with whom it is already far advanced in planning joint para-military operations.

P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. are in full agreement as to the allocation of activities arising out of the operations envisaged in the P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. Joint Plan. These joint operations can only be conducted successfully under the following conditions:

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(a) That a basis of collaboration be established between P.W.E./O.W.I. and the Norwegian authorities similar to that already existing between S.O.E./S.O. and the Norwegian authorities.

(b) That the Norwegian authorities permit S.O.E./S.O. to allocate to P.W.E./O.W.I. up to twenty Norwegians suitable for training and dispatch as political warfare agents. A few potential agents are available in the S.O.E.-managed holding pool, but, as they are all members of the Norwegian armed forces, they can only be seconded to P.W.E./O.W.I. by permission of the Norwegian High Command. It will, therefore, be necessary to recruit further personnel, some of whom may be found among Norwegian refugees in Sweden.

(c) That the Norwegian authorities make available to P.W.E. the necessary personnel for the revival of a Norwegian black radio station, to assist operations in the field before and after D.-day.

In order to disarm any possible Norwegian suspicions that P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. are attempting to carry on "foreign propaganda" in Norway, and to ensure active collaboration from the Norwegian side, it is recommended that the Joint P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan be presented as an integral part of, and a necessary precursor to, the Allied military plan for the liberation of Norway.

2. COMMENTS ON APPENDICES I, II AND III

The following comments are made on the assumption that the Norwegian authorities will accept the principle of the Outline Plan for Political Warfare, and will provide the necessary manpower and facilities required for the implementation of the operations listed below.

TOP SECRET

A.1. - Immobilisation of Enemy Transport - P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda and organisation by agents will distinguish between S.O.E./S.O. sabotage tasks (e.g. railways) to be undertaken by "professional" agents, and petty activities within the scope of "non-professional" agents. To assist in this differentiation, S.O.E./S.O. will indicate to P.W.E./O.W.I. the type of target selected for their D.-day operations.

A.2. - Undermining Troop Morale - Once the required number of agents are in the field, contact will be maintained through S.O.E./S.O. communications. P.W.E./O.W.I. will furnish S.O.E./S.O. an estimate of communications requirements, as well as estimates of distribution facilities needed to feed agents with propaganda material.

A.3. - Confusion of the Enemy - As far as the masses of the population are concerned, P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda and organisation by agents will supplement the more specific deception tasks allotted to S.O.E./S.O. by C.O.S.S.A.C. P.W.E./O.W.I. support will be all the more effective if the main terms of these tasks are divulged, so that their instructions to the field can be made as definite as possible.

A.4. - Guerrilla Activities - The extensive guerrilla activities for D.-day inspired and directed by S.O.E./S.O. and the Norwegian Home Front will be supplemented by pre-Day education of the "non-professional" masses by P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda. In addition, some special P.W.E./O.W.I. agents will be required, so that the earlier activities of any spontaneously organised bands will conform to S.O.E./S.O. requirements.

A.5. - Stirring up Strikes - The extent to which the Norwegian Home Front, in conjunction with the Norwegian Trades Unions, have already organised such activity is not known. However, P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda will support, and endeavour to enlarge, these activities, after consultation with the Norwegian authorities.

A.6. - Destruction of Records - All S.O.E./S.O. agents despatched to the field will receive special training in this subject, to be based on information secured from the Norwegian authorities. In addition, P.W.E./O.W.I. will endeavour to despatch one agent well-acquainted with vital enemy and Norwegian records, who will in turn recruit and train a number of special agents. Black and white propaganda to the masses of the population will back up the activities of agents.

A.7. - Depriving Enemy of Ford Stocks - S.O.E./S.O. plans and targets will be discussed with P.W.E./O.W.I.; the latter will give support with black and white propaganda to those special activities which appear to require stressing.

A.8. - Depriving Enemy of Collaborators - S.O.E./S.O. and the Norwegian Home Front have formulated plans for this operation; P.W.E./O.W.I. will, therefore, give support with black and white propaganda.

* * * * *

B.1, 2 - Utilisation of Population's knowledge - of Enemy Dispositions - of Topography - S.O.E./S.O. agents are automatically instructed in the importance of these subjects; but, the wider task of informing the masses of the population will be accomplished by P.W.E./O.W.I. propaganda, such instructions to be broken down into broad, simple categories based on known military requirements.

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B.3, 4, 5 - Utilisation of Local Labour Resources - of
Local Personnel for First Aid, etc., of Local
Local Administrative Personnel - Organisation

in the field by special agents and dissemination of propaganda, will aim at reaching the masses of the population as well as the various occupational groups already covered, to some extent, by activities of S.O.E./S.O. and the Norwegian Home Front.

B.6, 7 - Preservation of Records - Preservation of
Foodstuffs - These are the positive counterparts of A.6. and A.7., and are included in those operations.

* * * * *

C.1. - Preparing the population for an Allied Invasion,
and what this Entails - The distribution required, through S.O.E./S.O. and Norwegian Home Front channels, of a basic educational booklet will be estimated in terms of quantities and areas; P.W.E./O.W.I. may require special agents to supplement S.O.E./S.O. facilities.

C.2. - Securing Information for Distribution of
Propaganda to Civilian Population - the pre- and post-D.-day importance of this operation requires the services of special agents; in addition, adequate communications with agents in the field will be needed, either through the S.O.E./S.O. W/T network or through the Norwegian Home Front courier service from Stockholm.

C.3. - Distribution of News and Instructions - On the assumption that there may be a complete or partial "black-out" of radio listening due to the cutting off of power and current on D.-day, emergency channels for dissemination of news and instructions may be needed. The 5,000 battery receivers now being produced by S.O.E./S.O. for the Norwegian Home Front should provide adequate coverage; but, listening times for news, and wavelengths, will have to be arranged prior to D.-day.

TOP SECRET

C.4. - Maintenance of Contact - Assuming that satisfactory liaison is achieved between F.W.E./O.W.I. and the Norwegian Home Front, it is considered that the Joint F.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. activities will provide adequate contact with the masses of the population, but that, if agents can be spared, one or two should be allocated for this task.

* * * * *

3. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS

(1) Agents:

Approximately twenty agents will be required to be drawn, with the consent of the Norwegian authorities, from the S.O.E./S.O. Norwegian holding pool.

These men will be required principally for the following operations which are more particularly dependent on a sufficiency of trained agents:

- A.1. - Immobilisation of Enemy Transport
- A.2. - Undermining of Troop Morale
- A.3. - Confusion of the Enemy
- A.4. - Guerrilla Activities
- A.5. - Stirring up Strikes
- B.3, 4, 5. - Utilisation of Local Labour Resources, etc.
- C.2. - Securing Information for Propaganda to Civilians
- C.4. - Maintenance of Contact.

It is proposed to employ one agent in one locality on several operations.

(11) Equipment and facilities required between now and D.-day:

Detailed estimates cannot be formulated until after discussions have been arranged with the Norwegian Government. However, the following general requirements can be anticipated. To obtain these, the authority and backing of C.O.S.S.A.C. will probably be necessary.

TOP SECRET

(a) Greatly increased aircraft facilities for dropping containers of purely P.W.E./O.W.I. material;

(b) Greatly increased dropping of white leaflets by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. on specific targets;

(c) Increase of S.O.E. communications (W/T) for instructions to, and receiving reports from, agents in the field.

4. CONCLUSION

As stated in the last paragraph of the APPRECIATION, intervention by C.O.S.S.A.C. with the Norwegian Government is a pre-requisite to the establishment of satisfactory working relations between the latter and P.W.E./O.W.I. Until such a relationship exists in fact, the urgent task of training and despatching agents cannot be undertaken; without agents, the majority of the operations would either be impracticable or ineffective.

26th November, 1943.

JOINT P.W.E./O.W.I. AND S.O.E./S.O.POLITICAL WARFARE PLANRegional Summary - DENMARK

(General Note: This paper, jointly drafted by P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O., will be used as guidance by these Departments when translating from the general into the particular, the terms of the P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for Political Warfare, Annex II with Appendices I, II and III. The paper should, therefore, be read and considered as a commentary on the operational Appendices.)

1. APPRECIATION

In considering political warfare in Denmark, one important fact must be remembered: It is the only occupied country having no Government in Exile. This condition allows greater freedom of action for political warfare than would exist if a Government had to be consulted, or was required to collaborate on operations.

However, owing to its geographical position and consequent difficulties of communication and the introduction of agents into the country, hitherto purely operational considerations have been dominant; it has not been practical to give political warfare training to those S.O.E. agents now operating inside Denmark. But, in future, all S.O.E./S.O. agents despatched to the field will receive political warfare training.

It is agreed between P.W.E./O.W.I. and S.O.E./S.O. that the recruiting and training of political warfare agents for the furtherance of the Joint Plan should be put in hand at once. While one or two agents might be found in Great Britain, it is believed that the considerable number of Danish Aryan refugees who recently escaped to Sweden offer possibilities which should be explored through S.O.E./S.O. contacts from Stockholm. Training and indoctrination would probably take place in Sweden, owing to almost insuperable difficulties in transporting men from Sweden to Great Britain and back to Sweden or direct to Denmark.

TOP SECRET

Thus, the implementation of the Joint Plan resolves itself to this: provided that some five or six agents can be recruited, trained and delivered to Denmark, the operations proposed appear practicable.

2. COMMENTS ON APPENDICES I, II AND III

It should be noted that political warfare activities, organised from inside Denmark, are in the earliest stages of development. On the other hand, the self-discipline and organisation of the Danish Resistance groups, as exemplified by the results of actions and attitudes inspired and directed by S.O.E., show that, potentially, the following operations could be organised on an effective basis.

A.1.-Immobilisation of Enemy Transport - Specific S.O.E./S.O. plans will be supplemented by directed and organised actions of the masses of the population; however, the masses will be instructed to keep away from certain types of activity, so as to avoid conflict with S.O.E./S.O. operations.

A.2.-Undermining Troop Morale-Activity can best be stimulated through agents; it is possible that S.O.E./S.O. can assist by indoctrinating several head-agents who will in turn train and recruit sub-agents; the latter will remain entirely outside the S.O.E./S.O. field organisation. S.O.E./S.O. may also be able to provide courier facilities.

A.3.-Confusion of the Enemy-Distinction will be made between specific S.O.E./S.O. deception operations undertaken on instructions from C.O.S.S.A.C. and mass action to be stimulated by P.W.E./O.W.I. methods. Detailed plans, including the circulation of P.W.E./O.W.I. rumours, will be worked out when details are available as to the main deception plan.

A.4.-Guerrilla Activities-Apart from S.O.E./S.O. organised guerrillas who will operate on D.-day, some spontaneous action by the "non-professional" masses can be expected; P.W.E./O.W.I. activities will aim at indoctrinating these latter groups. In addition, P.W.E./O.W.I. are arranging for a "Speaker", whose voice will be made well known to Danes before D.-day, to broadcast operational instructions.

A.5.-Stirring up Strife-The collection of intelligence by P.W.E./O.W.I. which is essential for this operation is already in hand. Inciting the masses to go out on strike will be co-ordinated with S.O.E./S.O. who can assist in contacting and selecting potential strike leaders.

A.6.-Destruction of Records-It is agreed that, since almost all Danish civil servants are anti-German, concealment is more desirable than destruction, and easier to secure.

A.7.-Depriving Enemy of Food Stocks-General background propaganda will be sufficient to achieve this object.

A.8.-Depriving Enemy of Collaborators-P.W.E./O.W.I. maintain a comprehensive list of collaborators; it may prove desirable, through black radio or other means, to denounce some of these individuals before or on D.-day.

* * * *

B.1,2-Utilisation of Populations local knowledge of - Enemy Military Dispositions - of Topography - To prevent, as much as possible, an excess of unco-ordinated information, P.W.E./O.W.I. instructions and appeals will be made as definite as possible, and in line with known military requirements.

B.3, 4, 5, 6, 7-Utilisation of Local - Labour Resources - Personnel for First Aid - Administrative Personnel - Preservation of Foodstuffs - Preservation of Records -

As the Danish civil administration is a functioning entity, and is expected to be loyal to the Allies, general propaganda is expected to be sufficient to attain these objects.

* * * *

C.1.-Preparing Populations for an Allied Invasion, and what this Entails - S.O.E./S.O. are already providing P.W.E./O.W.I. with suitable intelligence from the field, so that the latter's continuing morale-building task can be made more effective. Propaganda on this wide theme will continue to be made more intensive.

C.2.-Securing Information for Direction of Operations
Civilian Population This operation is entirely dependent

on specially trained agents who will work in conjunction with a limited number of Danish patriots. Because the Danish civil administration will presumably remain virtually intact, the task is made somewhat easier.

C.3.-Distribution of News and Instructions-In anticipation of a radio "black-out" on D.-day caused by cutting off power and current, it may be necessary to provide an extension of S.O.E./S.O. field communications (W/T), and, in addition, to introduce into the country prior to D.-day several hundred battery receivers which can be organized into a national network of listening posts, for news and instructions.

C.4.-Maintenance of Contact-This operation is again rendered easier through the expected loyalty of the civil administration. S.O.E./S.O. agents, and Resistance group agents, will probably be called upon to co-operate.

* * * *

3. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS

(i) Agents:

Six agents, and if possible, four as reserves, are required as a minimum number to implement the operations envisaged. In all probability, these men will have to be recruited and trained in Sweden, from among the Danish Aryan refugees. It may be possible to bring one or two to Great Britain for training; but it is unlikely that time or travelling difficulties will permit all the agents to be trained here.

(ii) Equipment and Facilities required between now and D.-day

Detailed estimates cannot be formulated at this stage. However, the following general requirements can be anticipated. To obtain these, the authority and backing of C.O.S.S.A.C. will probably be necessary.

(a) Greatly increased aircraft facilities for dropping containers of purely P.W.E./O.W.I. material;

(b) Greatly increased dropping of white leaflets by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. on specific targets;

TOP SECRET

(c) Increase of S.O.E. communications (W/T) for instructions to, and receiving reports from, agents in the field.

4. CONCLUSION

The possibilities of recruiting suitable agents in Sweden will be examined shortly by S.O.E./S.O. through their representatives in Stockholm. Methods and place of training will be dependent on the outcome of this enquiry. It is clear, however, that unless trained agents can be despatched to Denmark, the greater part of the Joint Plan cannot be implemented; the necessity of implementing the plan is all the greater since comparatively little political warfare activity has been organised from the field.

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26th November, 1943.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division

REVISEDRANKIN COUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREI. TERMS OF REFERENCE

RANKIN C. is defined as: "The end of organised enemy resistance in North-West Europe: Unconditional Surrender of Germany."

II. APPRECIATION

1. This outline plan for RANKIN C. proceeds from the OVERLORD Plan and is a particularisation of some of its aspects.

2. This plan's first three aims are predicated on the existence of unorganised resistance. The last three aims concentrate on the transition from combat to occupational conditions.

3. The aims and objectives of this plan will in a large measure depend on the proclamations of S.H.A.E.F., which will in this context be P.W. instruments.

4. In implementing this plan particular attention will be paid to avoid inciting Occupied People to premature or precipitate action, which may lead to civil war or to German reprisals.

III. AIMS

1. To enlist all possible aid in ensuring the rapid seizure of our military objectives.

2. To affect the will of remaining combatants so that they will cease resistance.

3. To affect the will of both GERMANS and NON-GERMANS so that they will both actively and passively make continued resistance impossible.

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Rankin C

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4. To enlist all possible aid in facilitating the elimination by United Nations forces of pockets of resistance.

5. To induce in the enemy orderly compliance with the terms imposed after unconditional surrender.

6. To promote in all Europe an atmosphere in which the pacification of GERMANY and the reconstruction of the Continent may proceed with minimum expenditure of United Nations forces.

7. To minimize the effect of the Displaced Persons Problem on the military operations envisaged in RANKIN C.

The objectives and Themes supporting these aims are stated in Annexe I.

IV. MEANS

The preliminary and preparatory phases are covered in the OVERLORD Plan.

The Political/Psychological warfare operations under RANKIN C. will be carried out with the same policy machinery, the same personnel and the same media as in the past D-day phase of OVERLORD.

V. CHANGES

Whenever it becomes necessary to effect changes in the approved themes already embodied in the COSSAC Plan, one of the following procedure will become operative:

(a) O.W.E./O.W.I. will, on their own initiative in consultation with S.H.A.E.F., effect the necessary changes in their Central, or in Special, Directives.

(b) S.H.A.E.F., on their own initiative, will suggest changes to be incorporated in P.W.E./O.W.I. Central and Special Directives.

(c) For emergency or contingency decisions, L.P.C. will issue Special Directives.

TOP SECRETVI. ASSISTANCE DESIRED FROM AGENCIES, UNDER THE CONTROL OF OR CO-OPERATING WITH, THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

This assistance is set down in the P.W.E./O.W.I. Outline Plan for Political/Psychological Warfare for OVERLORD Annexes.

VII. INFORMATION

The releasing of information dealing with the initiation of major phases of the operation must be the function of S.H.A.E.F. In drafting the form in which the information is released, it will be essential that the requirements of P.W. as opposed to those of public relations and censorship, should be taken into full consideration. Directly S.H.A.E.F. have made known their wishes, P.W.E. and O.W.I. will give full publicity to the proper audiences by all media including radio announcements and, whenever feasible, leaflets.

VIII. COVERT OPERATIONS

Mutatis mutandis, this plan applies also to covert operations.

IX. RECOMMENDATION

Owing to the delicate question of precise relations with our allies, the Russians, extreme caution will be used in the employment of themes and aims as stated hereunder:

Annexe I, Aim II, Objective C, Theme 4

Annexe I, Aim III, Objective A, Theme 3

Annexe I, Aim V, Objective A, with themes developed thereunder.

TOP SECRETRANKIN C.OUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREANNEX IPROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMESAIM ONE

To enlist all possible aid in ensuring the rapid seizure of our military objectives.

Objective A.

Assisting the Allies to enter GERMANY quickly will ensure that War Criminals are punished.

Themes.

1. Assistance from local transportation facilities will aid allies.
2. Assisting Allies to enter GERMANY quickly will ensure that War Criminals are punished.
3. Assisting in implementing the "stand-fast" order.

Objective B.

Assisting the Allies to obtain military objectives will speed rehabilitation and relief.

Theme.

Assistance from local labor and transportation groups will ensure speedy rehabilitation and relief.

AIM TWO

To affect the will of remaining combatants so that they will cease resistance.

TOP SECRETObjective A.

To make combatants realize that GERMANY has suffered complete defeat.

Themes.

1. Central political and military authorities of GERMANY have surrendered to the United Nations and ordered their nationals to cease all resistance.

2. American, British and other United Nations armed forces are landing in Europe in large numbers.

3. The GERMAN armed forces have laid down their arms.

4. Organized resistance has ceased.

5. Remaining resistance is not part of a cohesive military plan.

6. Evidence that the great mass of the GERMAN people welcome the overthrow of the Nazi bosses and Gestapo spies and oppressors.

7. Air war against targets other than pockets of resistance has automatically ceased, but the threat still exists.

Objective B.

To make combatants realize it is their duty to cease resistance.

Themes.

1. Resistance is suicide. Resistance now is illegal. It is in defiance of both GERMAN and INTERNATIONAL LAW, and those who resist are not soldiers, but criminals.

2. Officers or leaders with a proper sense of responsibility to their men have already capitulated; only irresponsible fanatics or guilty consciences are encouraging further resistance.

TOP SECRET

3. Evidence of honourable and humane treatment of prisoners.

4. Central political and military authorities of GERMANY have surrendered to the United Nations. (Theme 1, Objective A.) Any Orders purporting to demand further resistance are forgotten.

5. The GERMAN armed forces have laid down their arms (Theme 3, Objective A.)

6. Resistance is not part of a cohesive military plan (Theme 5, Objective A.)

7. Germany needs all her surviving manpower for reconstruction.

8. Quislings in the Occupied Territories who foment continued resistance are traitors in the eyes of their country. They are using GERMAN soldiers to postpone their inevitable punishment.

Objective C.

To make combatants realise that it is within their power and in their interest to cease resistance.

Themes.

1. The repressive forces of the Nazi State which would previously have taken reprisals against those refusing to fight or against their families, have been disbanded and have disintegrated.

2. No leader has any longer the power or the authority to make men fight.

3. Those who continue resistance invite their own destruction.

4. The sooner ordinary GERMAN soldiers lay down their arms, the sooner will they return to their families.

TOP SECRETThemes for NON-GERMANS

1. GERMAN fanatics are seeking to strike a last vindictive blow to cause suffering and destruction before they are overwhelmed.

2. This last outrage delays restoration of peace and sanity to Europe; it is deferring relief and reconstruction.

N.B. While relief and rehabilitation in Europe are two of the chief aims of the military campaign, it will not be possible for the United Nations (through U.N.R.R.A.) to provide large quantities of food and relief until the military occupation has been completed.

3. This last outrage is delaying the moment when war prisoners and labour conscripts may return home from GERMANY.

Objective B.

To make non-combatants realise that they can play a part in ending resistance.

Themes.

1. The disintegration of the Wehrmacht and of GERMAN repressive machinery removes the risk which formerly attached to action against the GERMANS.

2. Small, isolated pockets of resistance are particularly vulnerable to both active and passive interference (e. g., sabotage and refusal to contribute in any way to last ditch resistance).

TOP SECRET

3. Even non-combatants far from the fighting zone may contribute to summary end of resistance by such means as stopping the flow of supplies to fighting units, immediately ceasing work in munition factories, obstructing and discouraging possible recruits for resisters, etc.

Objective C.

To make them realise that it is a duty to themselves and to their countries to help put an end to resistance.

Themes for GERMANS only

1. Since the central political and military leaders of the Reich have already surrendered to preserve GERMANY from further destruction, it is both illegal and immoral to engage in or support resistance.

2. The physical and moral rehabilitation of GERMANY depends upon GERMANS taking an active part. The first step is obstructing and discouraging resistance.

3. Lives needed for reconstruction of GERMANY must not be squandered in hopeless and pointless resistance.

4. Resistance necessarily involves the destruction of more families, homes and workshops and makes more difficult GERMANY'S task of building a stable society.

Themes for NON-GERMANS

1 Patriotism demands that Non-Germans participate in the liberation of their own countries. Non-Germans in Europe are the vanguard of the armies of liberation.

2. German resisters must not be allowed any longer to fight on non-German soil and endanger non-German lives and property.

TOP SECRET

3. This last attempt by the Germans to impose their will on non-Germans must be liquidated.

4. Ending GERMAN resistance is an essential step in rounding up war criminals.

5. GERMAN resistance must not be permitted to delay the restoration of NON-GERMAN prisoners of war and labor conscripts to their homes and families; GERMAN resistance must not be permitted to delay national rehabilitation.

6. The moral standing of European nations will be influenced by the degree of activity they have shown against the GERMANS.

7. Participation of quislings in GERMAN resistance is a criminal action and will be dealt with as such.

AIM FOUR (See Annex II, Appendix III of OVERLORD PLAN).

To enlist all possible aid in facilitating the elimination by United Nations forces of pockets of resistance.

Objective A.

To demonstrate to the people that their aid is still essential to the United Nations.

Themes.

1. The peoples of Europe are on the scene and in a position to inflict blows against the enemy at innumerable important places.

2. The peoples of Europe can expedite "mopping up" operations by containing and overpowering pockets of enemy resistance pending the arrival of United Nations forces.

3. The peoples of Europe can actively assist the movement and supply of United Nations forces.

TOP SECRET

4. The peoples of Europe have intimate knowledge of local conditions which they can place at the disposal of the United Nations forces.

5. The peoples of Europe can assist United Nations operations by their efforts to implement the "stand-fast" order to displaced persons.

Objective B.

To show the people of Europe how they can fit their actions into the United Nations military programme.

Themes.

1. United Nations military and political instructions should be listened to systematically and followed carefully.

2. Undisciplined and gratuitous violence has no part in United Nations plans. The crimes will be judged by Courts of Law.

Themes relating to Resistance Groups.

3. Resistance groups will give the lead to the civilian population in peaceful collaboration with the United Nations. In particular, they should be instructed:-

(i) To prevent destruction of road, rail and other transportation.

(ii) To report with their arms and explosives at the nearest Allied headquarters for embodiment in authorised patriot military establishments.

(iii) To refrain from personal vendettas against GERMAN forces and Quisling leaders.

(iv) To lead the way in an equitable distribution of food from indigenous sources.

TOP SECRETObjective C.

To show GERMANS it is in their interest that United Nations forces put an end to resistance.

Themes.

1. The United Nations forces are bringing order.

(Remainder same as for AIM TWO, Objective A. (Germans))

While making full use of the fact that the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter are meant for the GERMAN people as for all others, it is desirable at this stage to avoid any promises that specific benefits implicit in them will apply to GERMANY immediately or in the near future. Specific material promises, (e.g. foodstuffs) should also be avoided.

AIM FIVE.

To induce in the enemy orderly compliance with the terms imposed after unconditional surrender.

Objective A.

To convince the GERMANS that the terms of surrender are not unduly severe.

Themes.

(The actual terms of surrender will suggest many explanatory themes)

Objective B.

To inhibit, isolate and discredit elements interfering with the implementing of the surrender terms.

Themes.

1. There must be no private punishment, vengeance or destruction. Crimes will be punished by the Courts.

2. Troublemakers are ignoring the interests of GERMANY for their own selfish purposes.

TOP SECRET

3. Troublemakers are sabotaging GERMANY'S future.

4. The only people who are seeking to interfere with the implementing of the surrender terms are those who drove GERMANY into war.

Objective C.

To convince GERMANS that it is their duty to carry out the surrender terms.

Themes.

1. The surrender by the GERMAN central military and political authorities was in the name of the GERMAN people and binds them morally and legally.

2. Violation of the terms of surrender will inflict additional hardships on GERMANY.

Also Themes of Airm III, Objective C. (GERMANS).

Objective D.

To cause the GERMANS to preserve and maintain the machinery of daily living.

TOP SECRET

Themes.

1. The Germans themselves are responsible for acts of sabotage committed after the surrender.
2. Interference with normal routine life is sabotage.
3. The armies of the United Nations bring food, equipment and services sufficient for their own needs; any food and equipment destroyed is in reality the GERMAN people's loss.
4. Public hygiene facilities must be maintained if pestilence and epidemics are to be avoided.

Objective E.

To win GERMAN co-operation in implementing the surrender terms.

Themes.

1. United Nations forces are coming temporarily to administer the country and to preserve law and order. They are not coming to wreak indiscriminate vengeance on the GERMAN people.
2. Unconditional surrender signals the opportunity of the GERMAN people to assume the responsibility for their own future.

Also Themes of Objectives A.C. and D. of Aim IV.

AIM SIX

To promote in all Europe an atmosphere in which the pacification of GERMANY and the reconstruction of the continent may proceed without expenditure of United Nations forces.

Objective A.

To encourage restraint and moderation, and discourage violence in all things.

Themes.

1. The transition from war to peace means the abandonment of the motives and methods of war in favour of the orderly, civilized standards of peace.

2. Violence against people and property will be dealt with by the courts.

3. Political settlements will be reached with justice and without use of force.

4. The United Nations are determined to assure the establishment of justice, order and tranquility in Europe.

Objective B.

To inspire the peoples of the former occupied Countries to cooperate voluntarily as independent members of the family of nations.

Themes.

1. Reaffirmation of United Nations determination that each people shall freely choose its own ultimate form of government.

2. We salute heroic leaders of the resistance movement and call on the populace to follow their local leaders in maintaining law and order until the normal machinery of democratic government is re-established.

3. We share and support the common hopes and aspirations of the people of the Occupied Countries.

4. Recognition that the sufferings and experiences of the Occupied Peoples have given them not only the right but the competence to make an important contribution to the reorientation of the post-war world.

5. Full explanation, with particular applicability to each country, of United Nations plans for relief and rehabilitation.

6. The determination of the United Nations to do their utmost to secure redress for the acts of spoliation committed by the enemy in countries under their occupation (linking with the United Nations Declaration of Loot of 5th January, 1944).

AIM SEVEN.

To minimize the effects of the Displaced Persons Problem on the military operations envisaged in RANKIN C.

TOP SECRETObjective A.

To cause the displaced nations to remain where they are.

Themes.

1. The prompt implementation of plans for relief and rehabilitation require all peoples to remain where they are until the machinery can be put in motion.
2. Undirected movements involve the hazards and uncertainties of lack of food, lack of shelter and possible maltreatment by the GERMANS.
3. Military requirements must come first.
4. Conditions "at home" are apt to be worse than where people are.
5. Armistice conditions require the GERMAN Central Government to maintain food distribution.

Objective B.

To maintain order.

Themes.

1. Hardships, pestilence, disease always follow uncontrolled movements.

Objective C.

To canalize any movement along selected routes.

Themes.

1. Keep out of the way of troop movements.